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PROVING NEGLIGENCE IN MODERN PRODUCTS
LIABILITY LITIGATION*
David G. Owent
Negligence remains the most powerful theory of recovery in modem
products liability litigation.1 To prove a negligence claim in a products
liability case, the plaintiff must establish that the product's supplier failed to
exercise reasonable care for the plaintiffs safety. If the defendant is a
manufacturer, such proof ordinarily involves evidence that the defendant
acted unreasonably in developing, producing, or marketing a defective
product. Evidence of this type normally will establish, directly or
circumstantially, the components of the negligence calculus-the nature,
magnitude, and likelihood of a particular risk of harm, on the one hand,
weighed against the various costs and practicality of mitigating the risk, on
the other.2
Many aspects of proving negligence in a products liability case are
similar or identical to proving other types of products liability claims. For
example, expert testimony is as important to proving negligence as it is to
proving strict products liability in tort or breach of implied warranty.3 Proof
of other similar accidents and subsequent remedial measures is often
relevant to other types of claims as well as negligence.' Proof in cases
• © 2005 West. An earlier version of this article appears in DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS
LIABILITY LAW ch. 2 (2005).
t Carolina Distinguished Professor of Law, University of South Carolina. Special thanks
to Natalie Byars, Amy Neuschafer, David Watkins, Alyson Campbell, and Rochelle Oldfield for
research and editorial assistance.
1. This point was made some time ago by a prominent plaintiffs' attorney, as modem
products liability litigation was just getting off the ground. See Paul D. Rheingold, The
Expanding Liability of the Product Supplier: A Primer, 2 HOFSTRA L. REV. 521, 531-32 (1974)
(asserting that because negligence is "hot" and strict liability is "cold," plaintiffs are more likely
to win, and to collect larger verdicts, proving the former rather than the latter). More recently, an
important empirical study confirmed this hypothesis, revealing that jurors in fact respond more
favorably to plaintiffs-in terms of both the likelihood of success and verdict size-whose
claims are based on negligence rather than strict liability. See Richard L. Cupp Jr. & Danielle
Polage, The Rhetoric of Strict Products Liability Versus Negligence: An Empirical Analysis, 77
N.Y.U. L. REV. 874, 924 (2002). See generally DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW
§ 2.1 (2005).
2. See OWEN, supra note 1, § 2.2.
3. See id § 6.3; David G. Owen, A Decade of Daubert, 80 DENY. U. L. REV. 345, 347-48
(2002).
4. See OWEN, supra note 1, § 6.4; David G. Owen, Proof of Product Defect, 93 KY. L.J.
(forthcoming 2005) [hereinafter Owen, Proof of Product Defect].
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involving defective food or drink5 and automotive crashworthiness6 is quite
similar regardless of the cause of action. Finally, proof of compliance with a
statute or regulation, while relevant to negligence, spans all theories of
products liability and so is only treated lightly here.7
This article addresses three cardinal types of negligence evidence in
modem products liability litigation. Part I examines the effect of proof that a
manufacturer violated or complied with a safety statute or regulation, often
involving the doctrine of negligence per se. Part II considers the role of
evidence that a manufacturer departed from or complied with some
industrial safety standard. Part III explores the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
and describes its application to products liability litigation. The cases reveal
that a plaintiff's negligence claim ordinarily is enhanced by proof that a
manufacturer violated a relevant safety standard set by the government in a
statute or regulation, or by industry in a code, whereas a defendant's rebuttal
of such a claim typically is strengthened by proof that it complied with all
governmental and industry safety standards. In cases where a plaintiff is
unable to prove precisely how an accident happened, the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur provides a method for plaintiffs in products liability litigation to
establish a defendant's negligence by circumstantial evidence.8 The article
concludes that these forms of proof-that the product violated a
governmental or industry safety code or that it malfunctioned in a manner
that suggests the defendant's negligence-provide important tools for
determining a defendant's negligence in modem products liability litigation.
I. VIOLATION OF STATUTE-NEGLIGENCE PER SE
A. Statutory and Regulatory Safety Standards in Negligence Law
In negligence actions, the trier of fact normally sets the applicable
standard of care by applying the general common law standard of
reasonable care and prudence to the facts and circumstances of the
particular case. Products liability claims for negligence are usually
5. See OWEN, supra note 1, § 7.5; David G. Owen, Manufacturing Defects, 53 S.C. L.
REv. 851, 884-904 (2002) [hereinafter Owen, Manufacturing Defects].
6. See OWEN, supra note 1, § 17.3.
7. See id. § 14.3; David G. Owen, Special Defenses in Modern Products Liability Law,
70 Mo. L. REv. (forthcoming 2005) [hereinafter Owen, Special Defenses].
8. A parallel principle of proof, sometimes referred to as the "malfunction doctrine,"
applies in most states to proof of defect in strict liability in tort. See OWEN, supra note 1, § 7.4;
Owen, Manufacturing Defects, supra note 5, at 871-84.
adjudicated in this manner. Yet legislatures and regulatory agencies
sometimes specify particular safety measures required in certain situations
or particular dangerous conditions prohibited in others. Such statutes or
regulations may provide explicitly for civil damages arising from their
breach.9 More typically, however, safety statutes1 ° provide criminal or
quasi-criminal penalties for their violation. If a manufacturer, retailer, or
other products liability defendant fails to comply with a safety statute in a
manner that harms a plaintiff, the doctrine of negligence per se may permit
the plaintiff to establish the defendant's duty of care and breach thereof by
proving the statutory violation.' In such situations, a court borrows -the
specific standard of conduct set forth in the statute, 12 deferring to the
9. On civil damages acts, see 3 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., LAW OF TORTS § 17.6 (1995)
[hereinafter HARPER, LAW OF TORTS].
10. While the regulatory standards of the (usually federal) product safety agencies are
more frequently implicated in products liability litigation than specific legislative enactments,
the term "statute" is used here for convenience to designate either type of governmental safety
provision, state or federal. See, e.g., Lukaszewicz v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 510 F. Supp. 961, 964
(E.D. Wis. 1981) ("By 'statute' is meant both state and federal legislative and administrative
enactments.").
11. "[T]he violation of a statute, or regulation having the force of statute, enacted for the
safety of others is negligence in law or negligence per se." Price v. Blood Bank of Del., Inc.,
790 A.2d 1203, 1212-13 (Del. 2002). See generally 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY
3d §§ 12:10 to 12:38 (Timothy E. Travers et al. eds., 1987); 2 LoUIS R. FRUMER & MELVIN I.
FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY §§ 10.03, 55.02[3] (1990); OWEN, supra note 1, § 2.3; 2
DAVID G. OWEN ET AL., MADDEN AND OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 27.7 (2000) [hereinafter
MADDEN & OWEN]; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM (Basic
Principles) § 4(a) (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2001) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS];
Christopher Scott D'Angelo, Effect of Compliance or Noncompliance with Applicable
Governmental Product Safety Regulations on a Determination of Product Defect, 36 S. TEX. L.
REv. 453, 468-78 (1995); Malcolm E. Wheeler, The Use of Criminal Statutes to Regulate
Product Safety, 13 J. LEGAL STuD. 593, 593-96 (1984); Joseph H. Ballway, Jr., Comment,
Products Liability Based upon Violation of Statutory Standards, 64 MICH. L. REv. 1388, 1390-
93 (1966) (classic treatment).
On tort law more generally, see DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 133-42 (2001);
HARPER, LAW OF TORTS, supra note 9, § 17.6; W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON
ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 36 (5th student ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON];
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra, § 14 (2001); Charles L. B. Lowndes, Civil Liability
Created by Criminal Legislation, 16 MINN. L. REV. 361 (1932); Clarence Morris, The Role of
Criminal Statutes in Negligence Actions, 49 COLUM. L. REv. 21 (1949); Ezra Ripley Thayer,
Public Wrong and Private Action, 27 HARV. L. REV. 317 (1914).
For an examination of the effect of violation of or compliance with statute on proving
defectiveness, a closely related issue, see OWEN, supra note 1, § 6.4.
12. If a statutory standard is not specific, but merely restates a general safety principle of
tort law, the statute will have borrowed from the common law in which case there is no reason
for a state to borrow the standard back again. Thus, the doctrine of negligence per se applies
only to safety standards that are specific rather than vague and general. See, e.g., Shanks v.
Upjohn Co., 835 P.2d 1189, 1201 (Alaska 1992); Sikora v. Wenzel, 727 N.E.2d 1277, 1280
(Ohio 2000).
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legislative determination of proper behavior, in substitution for the general
definition of due care.13
B. Negligence Per Se-The Two-Pronged Test
All safety rules, whether statutory, regulatory, or common law, are
adopted to protect certain types of persons against specific risks. The scope
of all such rules is limited to this extent. 4 Accordingly, most courts will
adopt a standard of behavior set by a statute or regulation for use in a
negligence action only if it is determined that: (1) the plaintiff was injured
by a type of risk 5 the statute (or regulation) was intended to prevent and (2)
the plaintiff was in the class of persons the statute (or regulation) was
intended to protect. 6 This is the classic two-pronged test for deciding
whether a safety standard in a criminal safety statute may properly be used
as the standard of care in a negligence action under the doctrine of
negligence per se."
13. "When the doctrine of negligence per se applies, the general standard of care of a
reasonable man is replaced by a specific rule of conduct established in a statute or regulation."
Dougherty v. Santa Fe Marine, Inc., 698 F.2d 232, 234 (5th Cir. 1983). Compare Lukaszewicz,
510 F. Supp. at 964 ("A finding of 'negligence per se' serves to relieve a plaintiff in a products
liability case from proving specific acts of negligence."), with Dougherty, 698 F.2d at 234.
If the relevant statutes and regulations are numerous and complex, a plaintiff may need
expert testimony to explain the standards they establish and their breach to establish their
applicability to the litigation. See, e.g., McNeil Pharm. v. Hawkins, 686 A.2d 567, 580-85 (D.C.
1996).
14. See Hill v. Lundin & Assocs. Inc., 256 So. 2d 620, 623 (La. 1972); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 11, § 14 cmts.; Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact, 9
STAN. L. REv. 60, 73 (1956).
15. Note that courts and commentators often use the term "harm" for "risk of harm." See,
e.g., PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 11, § 36 at 227. The Third Restatement changes type of
"harm" to type of "accident." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 11, § 14.
16. "An actor is negligent if, without excuse, the actor violates a statute that is designed to
protect against the type of accident the actor's conduct causes, and if the accident victim is
within the class of persons the statute is designed to protect." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS,
supra note 11, § 14.
The Second Restatement of Torts formulates the doctrine in a four-part test, including class
of persons, interest, harm, and hazard. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (1965).
17. Many courts and commentators state the two-pronged test in reverse order, asking first
if the plaintiff is included in the protected class. Yet, because the class of plaintiffs intended to
be protected by a statute is largely a subset of the hazards the legislature sought to prevent, the
Third Restatement's ordering is preferable in suggesting that analysis begin with an inquiry into
the risks prevented, from which the class of protected victims tumbles easily.
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1. Risks Prevented
As for the types of risk sought to be prevented, courts have ruled that the
federal Motor Vehicle Safety Act, enacted to reduce traffic accidents and
deaths, sought to prevent deaths in an accident caused by a manufacturer's
deficient recall of a car with defective steering in violation of the Act's
recall provisions;18 that an FDA regulation requiring drug manufacturers to
report adverse reactions to the agency was intended to prevent just such
reactions;19 and that a state housing standards act was designed to protect
against the risks of unsafe construction and installation of mobile homes,
including failing to be anchored to the ground.2" On the other hand, a statute
requiring motor vehicles to be equipped with turn signals does not apply to
a road grader which is statutorily exempted therefrom;21 a statute prohibiting
the sale of cars equipped with hood ornaments that protrude beyond the face
of the radiator grill applies only to the hazard of hood ornaments on moving
cars piercing people, not the risk of people piercing themselves on the hood
ornament of a car at rest;22 a statute requiring that gasoline be dispensed
only into safe containers is intended to prevent the risk of leaks, not the risk
that gasoline bought in a cup might be used to throw on a person to facilitate
catching her on fire;23 a statute that prohibits false statements to the
government 24 is a "truth" statute, not a "safety statute" protecting users
against risks from prescription drugs;25 and an act requiring insurers of total-
loss vehicles to send their titles and plates to the Department of Revenue is
an "antitheft" act, not a safety statute designed to prevent such vehicles
from being defectively rebuilt and thereafter causing accidents.26
18. See Lowe v. Gen. Motors Corp., 624 F.2d 1373, 1377 (5th Cir. 1980) (involving a
violation of National Highway Traffic Safety Administration regulations governing automotive
recalls).
19. See Stanton v. Astra Pharm. Prods., Inc., 718 F.2d 553, 564 (3d Cir. 1983) (involving a
drug manufacturer who failed to file adverse reaction reports required by FDA regulation).
20. See Gem Homes, Inc. v. Contreras, 861 S.W.2d 449, 452 (Tex. App. 1993) (home
rolled over in storm).
21. See Cook v. Caterpillar, Inc., 849 S.W.2d 434,438-39 (Tex. App. 1993).
22. See Hatch v. Ford Motor Co., 329 P.2d 605, 608 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958).
23. See Walcott v. Total Petroleum, Inc., 964 P.2d 609, 613 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998).
24. "Whoever . . . knowingly and willfully falsifies . . . a material fact; makes any
materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation ... shall be [in violation of
this statute]." 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2004).
25. See McNeil Pharm. v. Hawkins, 686 A.2d 567, 580 (D.C. 1996) (discussing an action
on behalf of patient who died of severe liver failure following administration of defendant's
pharmaceutical).
26. See Treadwell Ford, Inc. v. Campbell, 485 So. 2d 312, 317-18 (Ala. 1986).
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2. Plaintiffs Protected
As for the class of plaintiffs sought to be protected, the federal Motor
Vehicle Safety Act, enacted to reduce traffic accidents and deaths, was
intended to protect the driver and passenger in a car that was dangerously
defective in violation of the act; 27 an FDA regulation prohibiting the use of
sulfites on raw fruits and vegetables seeks to protect sulfite-sensitive
individuals from consuming food so treated;28 and a state statute requiring
manufacturers of toxic products to supply purchasers with a material safety
data sheet (MSDS) is designed to protect users of the product, often the
purchaser's employees. 29 But an act requiring insurers to return titles and
licenses of total-loss vehicles to the Department of Revenue seeks to protect
owners of vehicles from thefts, not pedestrians injured by runaway vehicles
defectively rebuilt;3 ° a driving permit requiring paraplegic drivers to be
accompanied by co-drivers is intended to protect persons on the highways,
not the paraplegic driver himself while using a defective wheelchair lift on a
vehicle at rest;31 a state statute barring hood ornaments from protruding
beyond the front hood is intended to protect persons who might be struck by
moving cars, not those who impale themselves on (an ornament on) a car at
rest;32 and a statute prescribing standards for the use of LP gas is intended to
protect users in commercial settings, not contractors using such gas to heat
houses they are building.33
C. Other Negligence Per Se Requirements
An essential element of every negligence per se action is that the
defendant actually violated the pertinent statute or regulation, as proof that
the safety standard contained therein was breached.34 Indeed, a court
confronting a negligence per se claim sometimes may choose to reverse the
normal duty-breach order of decisionmaking by first considering the issue
of breach, because if the statute was not breached, there is no reason to
proceed to the sometimes more difficult analytical task of applying the two-
27. See Lowe v. Gen. Motors Corp., 624 F.2d 1373, 1380 (5th Cir. 1980).
28. See Allen v. Delchamps, Inc., 624 So. 2d 1065, 1067 (Ala. 1993) (noting that sale of
celery hearts treated with sodium bisulfite was in violation of FDA regulation).
29. Byme v. SCM Corp., 538 N.E.2d 796, 813 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989).
30. See Treadwell Ford, Inc., 485 So. 2d at 317-18.
31. See Keegan v. Joytech Int'l, Inc., No. E029026, 2002 WL 982643, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App.
May 14, 2002).
32. See Hatch v. Ford Motor Co., 329 P.2d 605, 608 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958).
33. See Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Streza, 8 P.3d 613, 616-17 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000).
34. See, e.g., McNeil Pharm. v. Hawkins, 686 A.2d 567, 582 (D.C. 1996); Cook v.
Caterpillar, Inc., 849 S.W.2d 434, 439 (Tex. App. 1993).
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pronged relevancy test. Further, even if a plaintiff establishes that a statute
was breached and meets the two-pronged test, so that it may be used to set
the relevant standard of care, the plaintiff still must prove each of the other
elements of a negligence claim.35 Moreover, application of the negligence
per se doctrine to any particular case is discretionary, and a court usually
should decline to adopt a statutory standard that is obsolete, arcane, trivial,
amounts to little more than a general common law rule of reasonable care, is
otherwise vague and of little help to the judicial branch in setting a standard
of reasonable care in a particular situation,36 or "if sufficient policy
considerations militate against it."37 Nor will a court apply a statutory
standard if the violation was not a cause in fact,38 or not a proximate cause,39
of the plaintiffs harm.
35. See, e.g., Gaines-Tabb v. ICI Explosives, USA, Inc., 160 F.3d 613, 622 (10th Cir.
1998) ("The violation of a statute constitutes negligence per se only if the other elements of
negligence are present.").
36. See, e.g., Shanks v. Upjohn Co., 835 P.2d 1189, 1201 (Alaska 1992) (stating trial court
did not abuse discretion in refusing to adopt standard of state drug misbranding statute that
merely requires labeling to contain adequate warnings and instructions); In re Shigellosis Litig.,
647 N.W.2d 1, 9 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002) (holding no negligence per se in food poisoning case for
violation of Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act prohibition against sale of adulterated food
because the Act fails to particularize any affirmative standard of care); Jones v. GMRI, Inc., 551
S.E.2d 867, 873 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001) (stating no negligence per se in case of metal in meatball
and state pure food act); Sikora v. Wenzel, 727 N.E.2d 1277, 1280 (Ohio 2000) (stating that
negligence per se applies where statute sets out a "positive and definite standard of care" but not
where it "contains a general, abstract description of a duty"); see also Dougherty v. Santa Fe
Marine, Inc., 698 F.2d 232, 234 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding that violation of one Coast Guard
regulation was not negligence per se where it was contradicted by another).
37. McNeil Pharm., 686 A.2d at 579 (quoting District of Columbia v. White, 442 A.2d
159, 164 (D.C. 1982)).
38. See, e.g., Alexander v. Smith & Nephew, P.L.C., 98 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1320 (N.D.
Okla. 2000) (stating that negligence per se claim failed in part on causation grounds because
plaintiff's orthopedic surgeon knew that the medical device had not been approved for inserting
bone screws in vertebral pedicles, but he relied on his own judgment in recommending this
surgery); Harden v. Danek Med., Inc., 985 S.W.2d 449, 453 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998) (indicating
that surgeon chose to make "off-label" use of product, relying on his own experience and
judgment).
39. See, e.g., Brooks v. Howmedica, Inc., 236 F.3d 956, 967 (8th Cir. 2001); Gaines-Tabb,
160 F.3d at 623 (holding that defendant's manufacture and sale of ammonium nitrate used by
terrorists to bomb federal building in Oklahoma City was not the proximate cause of injuries due
to "the intervention of a supervening cause-the unforeseeable, nearly unprecedented, criminal
bombing of the Murrah Building. Absent proximate cause there can be no negligence, per se or
otherwise."); Walcott v. Total Petroleum, Inc., 964 P.2d 609, 611-12 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998)
(holding that a filling station's sale of gasoline in paper cup to a customer was not a proximate
cause of injuries to a person on whom customer threw gasoline to set that person on fire).
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D. Licensing Statutes
Whether on grounds of proximate causation or scope of risk, a
defendant's violation of a licensing statute generally does not amount to
negligence per se.4" Thus, a restaurant's failure to obtain an operating
license from the health department, a drug manufacturer's failure to obtain
proper FDA approval of a new drug or medical device,4" or an aircraft
manufacturer's failure to obtain proper certification from the FAA for a new
airplane, each may subject the manufacturer to administrative penalties, but
none of these violations converts the defendant into an outlaw and subject to
absolute liability. Food sold by an unlicensed restaurant may be just as pure
and tasty as food sold by a restaurant that licensing officials grade as "A."
A drug or medical device may be reasonably safe despite it not being
approved for use by the FDA. An uncertified plane may be entirely
airworthy and equally as safe as a plane approved by the FAA. In such
cases, a plaintiff may not rest upon the defendant's violation of a
certification rule but must prove the defendant's negligence another way.42
E. Excuses
Treating a defendant's violation of a statute as a breach of duty amounts
to a form of "strict" liability: liability flows merely from the defendant's
breach of statute rather than from demonstrative proof of how the defendant
was at fault. That is, a plaintiff may establish a breach of the duty of care
without specific evidence showing how the defendant's actions were
unreasonable, in how they foreseeably exposed the plaintiff to an undue risk
of harm.4 3 Yet this strictness in the basis of liability usually is fleeting, for
40. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 11, § 36, at 226; Charles 0. Gregory, Breach of
Criminal Licensing Statutes in Civil Litigation, 36 CORNELL L.Q. 622, 630-42 (1951).
41. See, e.g., Talley v. Danek Med., Inc., 179 F.3d 154, 159-60 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding
that FDA premarketing approval regulations are administrative in nature and do not establish a
standard of care or quality in the case of pedicle screws sold for unapproved purposes); King v.
Danek Med., Inc., 37 S.W.3d 429, 453-60 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) (same). See generally James
M. Beck & John A. Valentine, Challenging the Viability of FDCA-Based Causes of Action in
the Tort Context. The Orthopedic Bone Screw Experience, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 389 (2000).
Breach of federal statutes and regulations also raise issues of federal preemption. See OWEN,
supra note 1, § 14.3.
42. See, e.g., Talley, 179 F.3d at 159-60; Keegan v. Joytech Int'l, Inc., No. E029026, 2002
WL 982643, at *4-*5 (Cal. Ct. App. May 14, 2002) (involving a paraplegic truck driver's
violation of special licensing statute); King, 375 S.W.3d at 453-60.
43. See, e.g., Ross Labs. v. Thies, 725 P.2d 1076, 1081 (Alaska 1986) (involving a
retailer's unknowing violation of misbranding provisions of state food, drug, and cosmetic act:
"the basis for the retailer's liability perhaps could as aptly be called strict liability per se");
Magna Trust Co. v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 728 N.E.2d 797, 805-06 (I11. App. Ct. 2000); see also Elliott
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most courts in most situations reset liability back on a fault foundation by
providing a broad range of excuses that cover most situations in which a
defendant could not reasonably have avoided the violation or the harm.44
Many courts accept the list of excuses set forth in the Restatement of Torts
which relieves a defendant of liability in negligence for a violation of a
statute or administrative regulation if the violation is due to the defendant's
incapacity, unawareness of a need for compliance,45 inability to comply, 6 an
emergency not due to the defendant's own misconduct, or if compliance
would have presented a greater risk of harm than did the violation. 7 While
these traditional negligence per se excuses may not be relevant to most
products liability litigation,48 they sometimes are germane49 in which case
they should be available as in any other context.5
F. Procedural Effect
Jurisdictions vary in the procedural effect accorded to a statutory or
regulatory violation.5 Some courts, perhaps a majority," hold that such a
violation conclusively establishes the defendant's negligence. That is, an
v. City of New York, 747 N.E.2d 760, 762 (N.Y. 2001) (observing that violation of statute that
creates specific duty "constitutes negligence per se, or may even create absolute liability").
44. See Sikora v. Wenzel, 727 N.E.2d 1277, 1281 (Ohio 2000); DOBBS, supra note 11,
§§ 140-41; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 11, § 36, at 227-29. And sometimes courts simply
refuse to apply negligence per se. See, e.g., Mehlman v. Diamond Sparklers, Inc., No. 99-CV-
3700SJ, 2002 WL 32096585, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 2002) (refusing to rule that violation of
statute criminalizing sale of fireworks in New York resulted in strict or absolute liability).
45. See, e.g., Sikora, 727 N.E.2d at 1281. But see Ross Labs., 725 P.2d at 1080-81 (Alaska
1986); Dura Corp. v. Hamed, 703 P.2d 396, 410 (Alaska 1985) (stating manufacturer's
ignorance of standards of nationally recognized safety code no excuse).
46. See, e.g., Roth v. I & M Rail Link, L.L.C., 179 F. Supp. 2d 1054, 1063 (S.D. Iowa
2001) (impossibility of compliance, meaning "not reasonably practicable").
47. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288A (1965).
48. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 11, § 4 cmt. d.
49. As when a drug or other chemical's risk is unforeseeable.
50. See D'Angelo, supra note 11, at 468-79.
51. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 11, § 36, at 229-31.
52. Commentators have long asserted that the conclusive effect proclaimed by Judge
Cardozo in Martin v. Herzog, 126 N.E. 814, 815 (N.Y. 1920), that "[j]urors have no... power
... [to] relax" the standard set by the legislature, is the majority rule. See, e.g., Ballway, supra
note 11, at 1393-94 (1966) (citing sources mostly prior to 1950); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 11, § 14 cmt. c reporters' note (stating that Martin v. Herzog's
conclusive effect approach is "the strong majority rule"). Yet, because of the different meanings
of the phrase "negligence per se," because of the absence of a methodical study of every
jurisdiction, and because many of the more recent cases treat statutory violations as mere
evidence of negligence, it is unclear whether most jurisdictions still treat the violation of statute
as conclusive of negligence. Ballway, supra note 11, at 1396.
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unexcused violation of a statute or regulation is negligence in itself, or
negligence "per se."53 While such a procedural effect powerfully stamps the
violation as a breach of duty as a matter of law, it nevertheless leaves open
all other issues involved in a negligence cause of action, such as cause in
fact, proximate cause, the plaintiffs damage, and any affirmative defenses
that might apply. 4 Many other jurisdictions treat a violation merely as
evidence of negligence, 5 perhaps the best approach,56 which the trier of fact
may accept or reject as it sees fit. In a small number of jurisdictions, by
common law or statute, a violation of a safety statute or regulation creates a
rebuttable presumption of negligence." Some jurisdictions that give
conclusive status to violations of a legislature's statutes give a lesser, mere-
evidence effect to violations of a city's ordinances" or regulations of
administrative agencies,59  both considered "subordinate rule-making
bod[ies].'6°
53. See, e.g., Stanton v. Astra Pharm. Prods., Inc., 718 F.2d 553, 564-65 (3d Cir. 1983);
Harned v. Dura Corp., 665 P.2d 5, 12-13 (Alaska 1983) (finding that failure of tank to conform
to ASME standards, incorporated into state law, was negligence per se); McNeil Pharm. v.
Hawkins, 686 A.2d 567, 578 (D.C. 1996) (finding that an unexcused violation renders defendant
negligent as a matter of law); Peek v. Oshman's Sporting Goods, Inc., 768 S.W.2d 841, 844
(Tex. App. 1989). This is the rule of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288B.
54. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 11, § 36, at 229-31.
55. See, e.g., Berish v. Bomstein, 770 N.E.2d 961, 979 (Mass. 2002); Horstmeyer v.
Golden Eagle Fireworks, 534 N.W.2d 835, 838 (N.D. 1995); King v. Danek Med., Inc., 37
S.W.3d 429, 460 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).
56. According a breach of statute any greater weight confronts a number of theoretical
obstacles. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 11, § 36, at 220-22.
57. See, e.g., Ramirez v. Plough, Inc., 863 P.2d 167, 172 (Cal. 1993) (citing evidence
code); Klanseck v. Anderson Sales & Serv., Inc., 393 N.W.2d 356, 360 (Mich. 1986). In other
jurisdictions, a violation of such a statute or regulations is "prima facie" evidence of negligence,
raising such a presumption but allowing an excuse. See, e.g., Magna Trust Co. v. Ill. Cent. R.R.
Co., 728 N.E.2d 797, 804-05 (I11. App. Ct. 2000) ("Since the violation is only prima facie
evidence of negligence, a defendant may prevail by showing that he acted reasonably under the
circumstances."); Bacon v. Lascelles, 678 A.2d 902, 907 (Vt. 1996); see also COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 13-21-403(2) (2004) (rebuttable presumption); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3304(b) (2003) (stating
a product is deemed defective unless a manufacturer shows that the violation was a reasonably
prudent action). The rebuttable presumption approach is further discussed in OWEN, supra note
1, § 14.3.
58. See, e.g., Elliott v. City of New York, 747 N.E.2d 760, 761-62 (N.Y. 2001).
59. See, e.g., Montalvo v. Rheem Textile Sys., Inc., No. 86-CIV-9501(SWK), 1991 WL
52777, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 1991) (stating that a violation of state workplace safety agency
regulation requiring that presses be equipped with and operable by two separate push-buttons
was merely evidence of negligent design, not conclusive).
60. See Elliott, 747 N.E.2d at 762-63 (citing Martin v. Herzog, 126 N.E. 814 (N.Y.
1920)). See generally PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 11, § 36, at 231.
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G. Federal Law and Federal Courts
Negligence per se claims, being creatures of state tort law, must be
distinguished from the federal doctrine prescribing when a private cause of
action may be implied into a federal statute.61 More narrow than negligence
per se, the federal implication doctrine allows private claims only when
Congress clearly so intended.62 While the federal implication doctrine may
be its cousin, negligence per se is an independent, substantive doctrine of
state tort law applicable in both state courts
63 and federal diversity actions 64
61. See Paul Sherman, Use of Federal Statutes in State Negligence Per Se Actions, 13
WHITTIER L. REv. 831, 864-66 (1992).
62. See also Gibson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 189 F. Supp. 2d 443, 448 (W.D. Va. 2002)
(disallowing private claims under Federal Hazardous Substances Act and Poison Prevention
Packaging Act). Compare Swenson v. Emerson Elec. Co., 374 N.W.2d 690, 693 (Minn. 1985)
(allowing private claim for violation of CPSC's substantial product hazard reporting
regulations), with Drake v. Honeywell, Inc., 797 F.2d 603, 605 (8th Cir. 1986). Contra Martin v.
Ortho Pharm. Corp., 661 N.E.2d 352, 355-57 (Ill. 1996) (involving a risk of birth limb
reductions from pills used in the first trimester of a pregnancy; disallowing private claim for
violation of FDA consumer information regulations). See generally Nat'l Bank of Commerce v.
Kimberly-Clark Corp., 38 F.3d 988, 995-96 (8th Cir. 1994) (allowing the estate of woman
killed by toxic shock syndrome to sue a manufacturer for non-compliance with warning
requirement of Medical Device Amendments to Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act-type size too
small, not written for sixth to eighth grade reading level, and absence of boldface or different
colors for certain portions demanded by FDA prominence requirement); William R. Goetz,
Private Causes of Action Under the Reporting Rules of the Consumer Product Safety Act, 70
MiNN. L. REv. 955 (1986).
Like substantive federal law itself, private rights of action to enforce federal law must be
created by Congress. The judicial task is to interpret the statute Congress has passed to
determine whether it displays an intent to create not just a private right, but also a private
remedy. Statutory intent on this latter point is determinative. Without it, a cause of action does
not exist and courts may not create one, no matter how desirable that might be as a policy
matter, or how compatible with the statute.
Compare Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 287-88 (2001) (describing how implication
doctrine narrowed from J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964)), with Cort v. Ash,
422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975) (citations omitted). Cort's four-factor test has effectively been conflated
back into the one determinative factor of congressional intent. See Jackson v. Birmingham Bd.
of Educ., 309 F.3d 1333, 1338 n.5 (11th Cir. 2002).
63. See, e.g., Wallace v. Parks Corp., 629 N.Y.S.2d 570, 575-76 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995)
(allowing negligence claim for violating labeling requirements of Federal Hazardous Substances
Act, notwithstanding federal preemption of inadequate warnings claims); Nissan Motor Co. v.
Armstrong, 32 S.W.3d 701, 711 (Tex. App. 2000) (involving a car manufacturer's failure to
report safety defect under federal law) (dictum).
64. Milanese v. Rust-Oleum Corp., 244 F.3d 104, 109-10 (2d Cir. 2001) (allowing
negligent "misbranding" claim for violating labeling requirements of Federal Hazardous
Substances Act, although federal preemption precluded inadequate warnings claim that asserted
manufacturer should have provided warnings in addition to those required by Act); Stanton v.
Astra Pharm. Prods., Inc., 718 F.2d 553, 564 (3d Cir. 1983) (involving a drug manufacturer that
failed to file adverse reaction reports required by FDA regulation); Loewy v. Stuart Drug &
Surgical Supply, Inc., No. 91-CIV-7148(LBS), 1999 WL 216656, at *2-*3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14,
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for violations of both state65 and federal66 statutes and regulations, regardless
of whether the implication doctrine would also allow a private claim.67 If the
negligence per se issue concerns a federal statute or regulation, an unrelated
but important issue will be whether the federal law preempts the claim for
negligence per se together with some or all of the plaintiffs other products
liability claims, an issue of growing significance in products liability
litigation.68
1999) (pedicle screw case; violation of Medical Device Amendments to Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act); Sharp v. Artifex, Ltd., 110 F. Supp. 2d 388, 392-94 (W.D. Pa. 1999)
(same).
Some courts disagree, mistakenly believing that to allow such state law claims, even in a
diversity action, is somehow inconsistent with a ruling that the statute does not allow a private
right of action under the implication doctrine as a matter of federal law. See, e.g., Hackett v.
G.D. Searle & Co., 246 F. Supp. 2d 591, 594 (W.D. Tex. 2002) ("Because the FDCA does not
provide for a private cause of action, many courts have held plaintiffs cannot seek to enforce it
through negligence per se tort actions."); Rodriguez v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 858 F. Supp. 127,
129-31 (D. Ariz. 1994) (disallowing negligence per se claim for not meeting standards for
implying cause of action into statute in a case of manufacturer of exploding bug bombs failing
to comply with adverse incidents reporting requirements of FIFRA). See generally Beck &
Valentine, supra note 41. But these courts and commentators miss the point: that negligence per
se, as a matter of state common-law doctrine, borrows the standard of proper behavior from a
state or federal statute, not because the legislature intended to create a private cause of action for
breach of the statute, but because a standard of behavior specified in a statute may provide a
better standard of conduct for a court to employ in a negligence case than the general tort law
standard of reasonable prudence. See, e.g., Lowe v. Gen. Motors Corp., 624 F.2d 1373, 1381
(5th Cir. 1980) (applying Alabama law holding that a violation of federal automotive safety
statute in diversity action was negligence per se; because no private right of action or federal
question was involved, "Cort v. Ash was not at all at issue in this case."). See generally Fleming
James, Jr., Statutory Standards and Negligence in Accident Cases, 11 LA. L. REv. 95, 106
(1950-51); Thayer, supra note 11, at 322-28.
65. See, e.g., Gaines-Tabb v. ICI Explosives, USA, Inc., 160 F.3d 613, 621-623 (10th Cir.
1998) (state statute and regulations governing sale of explosives) (by implication); Montalvo v.
Rheem Textile Sys., Inc., No. 86-CIV-9501(SWK), 1991 WL 52777, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4,
1991) (state workplace safety agency regulation requiring presses to be equipped with and
operable by two separate push-buttons).
66. See, e.g., Sharp, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 392-94 (violations of FDCA and MDA by pedicle
screw manufacturer); Allen v. Delchamps, Inc., 624 So. 2d 1065, 1067-68 (Ala. 1993) (selling
celery hearts treated with sodium bisulfite in violation of FDA regulation); Price v. Blood Bank
of Del., Inc., 790 A.2d 1203, 1212-13 (Del. 2002) (violation of FDA blood donor screening
regulations).
67. "The mere fact that the law which evidences negligence is Federal while the
negligence action itself is brought under State common law does not mean that the state law
claim metamorphoses into a private right of action under Federal regulatory law." Lowe, 624
F.2d at 1379 (violation of Motor Vehicle Safety Act provisions governing automotive recalls);
see also In re Starlink Corn Prods. Liab. Litig., 212 F. Supp. 2d 828, 836 (N.D. Ill. 2002)
(violation of FIFRA labeling requirements could support negligence per se claims even though
there is no federal private right of action under statute).
68. The doctrine of federal preemption is examined in OWEN, supra note 1, § 14.4.
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H. Compatibility with Ordinary Negligence Claims
Finally, it is important to note that negligence per se claims are separate
and independent from ordinary negligence claims, yet the two claims are
quite compatible. Indeed, plaintiffs typically and properly include counts for
both ordinary negligence and negligence per se in the same complaint, and a
plaintiff may prevail by establishing the defendant's breach of its duty of
care on either form of negligence claim.69
I. Compliance with Statutory and Regulatory Safety Standards-
Evidence of Due Care
Since a manufacturer or other product seller may be found negligent per
se if it violates an applicable product safety statute or regulation, a
defendant in a products liability case might fairly ask to be shielded from
negligence liability if it complies with an applicable safety statute or
regulation."0 Yet, because "the lawmaking process can sometimes be
insufficiently attentive to the interests of potential victims,"71 a product
seller's compliance with a statutory or regulatory safety standard in a
negligence action is proper evidence of a product's nondefectiveness but is
not conclusive of that issue.72 In very unusual situations, where no special
circumstances suggest the need for greater caution, a court may rule as a
matter of law that a defendant's conformity to a statutory or regulatory
69. Indeed, because of the possibility that a court will exercise its discretion to deny a
negligence per se claim, or find an applicable excuse, a plaintiff's lawyer who limits the
complaint to a negligence per se claim and thereby loses the suit risks a subsequent action for
malpractice.
70. See OWEN, supra note 1, § 14.3; Richard C. Ausness, The Case for a "Strong"
Regulatory Compliance Defense, 55 MD. L. REV. 1210, 1241-47 (1996); D'Angelo, supra note
11, at 453-66; Robert L. Rabin, Regulatory Compliance as a Defense to Products Liability, 88
GEO. L.J. 2049 (2000).
71. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 11, § 4 cmt. d; see Theresa Moran
Schwartz, The Role of Federal Safety Regulations in Products Liability Actions, 41 VAND. L.
REv. 1121, 1146-60(1988).
72. "[C]ompliance with a statutory standard is evidence of due care, [but] it is not
conclusive on the issue. Such a standard is no more than a minimum, and it does not necessarily
preclude a finding that the actor was negligent in failing to take additional precautions."
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 11, § 36, at 233; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note
11, § 4 cmt. b ("[C]ompliance is evidence of non-negligence but is not conclusive.").
Historically, this principle was perhaps first applied in Bradley v. Boston & Maine Railroad, 56
Mass. 539, 543 (1848), and was restated by the Supreme Court in Grand Trunk Railway Co. v.
Ives, 144 U.S. 408, 420-27 (1892). "In modem years, the rule has been frequently applied in
products-liability cases where the defendant has complied with a federal regulatory standard."
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 11, § 16 cmt. b reporters' note.
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safety standard amounts to due care as a matter of law." A few state
products liability reform statutes provide that compliance with a statute or
regulation gives rise to a rebuttable presumption that the manufacturer was
not negligent.74 In the great majority of cases, however, because legislatures
and regulatory agencies normally set safety standards at minimally
acceptable levels, a jury is free to find that a manufacturer was negligent for
failing to take further steps to improve the product's warnings,75 design,76 or
manufacture77 beyond the level of safety required by the government. The
Restatement (Third) of Torts is in accord." The topic of compliance with
governmental safety statutes and regulations is quite complex. 9
73. See, e.g., Ramirez v. Plough, Inc., 863 P.2d 167, 172-74, 176-77 (Cal. 1993) (holding
that compliance with FDA's English language only warning requirement shielded drug
manufacturer from also having to warn in Spanish that giving aspirin to children suffering flu
might cause Reyes Syndrome); Beatty v. Trailmaster Prods., Inc., 625 A.2d 1005, 1013-14 (Md.
1993) (stating that compliance with bumper height statute was complete defense); see
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 11, § 16 cmt. e (stating that in "unusual
situations," statutory or regulatory compliance may be conclusive).
74. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-403(1) (2004); IND. CODE § 34-20-5-1(2) (2004).
Compare Cansler v. Mills, 765 N.E.2d 698, 705-07 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (presumption rebutted;
summary judgment for manufacturer reversed), with McClain v. Chem-Lube Corp., 759 N.E.2d
1096, 1101-03, 1106 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (presumption not rebutted; summary judgment for
manufacturer).
75. See, e.g., Moss v. Parks Corp., 985 F.2d 736, 741 (4th Cir. 1993) (CPSC labeling
regulations for paint thinner under Federal Hazardous Substances Act); Ferebee v. Chevron
Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1539-43 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (EPA-approved label for paraquat
herbicide, under Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act); Caraker v. Sandoz
Pharm. Corp., 172 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1033 (S.D. I11. 2001) ("[T]he FDA's drug labeling
decisions impose only 'minimum' standards that are open to supplementation by state law
through a jury's verdict enforcing a manufacturer's common law duty to warn."); Stevens v.
Parke, Davis & Co., 507 P.2d 653, 661 (Cal. 1973) (FDA warnings requirements); Burch v.
Amsterdam Corp., 366 A.2d 1079, 1084-86 (D.C. 1976) (Federal Hazardous Substances Act
labeling requirements).
76. See, e.g., Brooks v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 902 P.2d 54, 63 (N.M. 1995) (involving
crashworthiness of aircraft design; evidence of defendant's compliance with applicable
government regulations is relevant to whether it was negligent but does not conclusively
establish its non-negligence).
77. Cf Reiter v. Zimmer Inc., 897 F. Supp. 154, 157-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (manufacturing
procedures for prosthesis implant cement allegedly failed to meet FDA "good manufacturing
practices").
78. Section 4(b) of the Products Liability Restatement provides that, in connection with
liability for defective designs and warnings,
a product's compliance with an applicable product safety statute or
administrative regulation is properly considered in determining whether the
product is defective with respect to the risks sought to be reduced by the
statute or regulation, but such compliance does not preclude as a matter of




A. Industry Standards as Custom-In General
Custom, how a community addresses particular situations according to
prevailing social norms, is one of the most rudimentary and powerful
sources of law.8° Because the standard of reasonable behavior in negligence
law is grounded in community norms, 81 whether a person who has caused
harm to another acted or failed to act as similar persons customarily act in
the same situation goes to the heart of negligence determinations. It thus is
not surprising that one of the traditional definitions of negligence is the
failure to exercise "ordinary" care.82 This definition reflects the thought that
most actors most of the time seek to act in a sensible, prudent manner,
reasonably balancing the costs and benefits to others as well as to
themselves. And actors, in attempting to make rational choices about how to
act in given situations, necessarily frame those decisions against a backdrop
of the expected environment of their actions, including the customary
behavior of others.
Yet people tend to be self-centered and imperfect, and persons in a
complex world aiming to achieve certain primary goals can only be
distracted by having to take steps to protect others from risks ancillary to the
achievement of the actors' objectives. In such situations, it is not uncommon
for people to devote less care and attention to protecting others from the
risks of their activities than warranted by ordinary prudence. Here, a person
would be negligent for failing to conform to the customary level of care. In
many other situations, the converse can be true: the community over time
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 4(b) (1998). While this provision is
framed in terms of product defects, it draws from and embraces products liability negligence
claims as well. See Id. cmt. e reporters' note.
The Restatement provides: "An actor's compliance with a pertinent statute, while evidence
of non-negligence, does not preclude a finding that the actor is negligent under § 3 for failing to
adopt precautions in addition to those mandated by the statute." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS, supra note 11, § 16(a).
79. See OWEN, supra note 1, § 14.3.
80. See Robert D. Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens? An Economic Analysis of
Internalized Norms, 86 VA. L. REv. 1577 (2000); Robert D. Cooter, The Structural Approach to
Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1643 (1996); Robert C. Ellickson,
Law and Economics Discovers Social Norms, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 537 (1998).
81. See, e.g., PROSSER& KEETON, supra note 11, § 33, at 193-96.
82. The person of "ordinary prudence" standard in negligence law can be traced at least to
Vaughan v. Menlove, 132 Engl. Rep. 490, 492-93 (C.P. 1837). It still is sometimes employed.
See, e.g., Morden v. Cont'l AG, 611 N.W.2d 659, 675 (Wis. 2000). See generally PROSSER &
KEETON, supra note 11, § 32, at 174.
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may allow the ordinary level of care for protecting others to fall below the
level of care that a reasonably prudent person would provide. Here, an actor
would be negligent for conforming to the customary level of care. In short,
while the standard of customary prudence often is the standard of
reasonable prudence, sometimes it is not. In the famous T. J. Hooper83 case,
Judge Learned Hand articulated the rule, by then well established, 4 that
industry practice or custom is important evidence of the reasonableness of
its members' conduct but that it generally is not conclusive on *due care,
since the industry as a whole may have been derelict in failing to adopt
precautionary measures dictated by reasonable prudence.85 This conclusion
leads to the universal rule 6 in negligence law that a defendant's
conformance to or violation of applicable customary standards of care
ordinarily is some evidence, but rarely conclusive, of whether a particular
defendant in fact exercised due care in a particular situation.87
83. 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932).
84. Judge Hand drew from Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Behymer, 189 U.S. 468, 470
(1903), in which Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. observed, "What usually is done may be evidence
of what ought to be done, but what ought to be done is fixed by a standard of reasonable
prudence, whether it usually is complied with or not." Id
85. See T. J. Hooper, 60 F.2d at 740:
[I]n most cases reasonable prudence is in fact common prudence; but strictly
it is never its measure; a whole calling may have unduly lagged in the
adoption of new and available devices. It never may set its own tests,
however persuasive be its usages. Courts must in the end say what is
required; there are precautions so imperative that even their universal
disregard will not excuse their omission.
Id.
86. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 11, § 13, which provides:
(a) An actor's compliance with the custom of the community, or of others
in like circumstances, is evidence that the actor's conduct is not negligent but
does not preclude a finding of negligence.
(b) An actor's departure from the custom of the community, or of others
in like circumstances, in a way that increases risk is evidence of the actor's
negligence but does not require a finding of negligence.
Id. On the role of evidence of custom in negligence law, there is no minority view. See id. cmt. b
reporters' note.
87. See DOBBS, supra note 11, § 16.3; HARPER, LAW OF TORTS, supra note 9, § 17.3;
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 11, § 33, at 193-96; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 295A; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 11, § 13; Richard A. Epstein, The Path to
The T. J. Hooper: The Theory and History of Custom in the Law of Tort, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 1
(1992); Steven Hetcher, Creating Safe Social Norms in a Dangerous World, 73 S. CAL. L. REv.
1 (1999); Clarence Morris, Custom and Negligence, 42 COLUM. L. REv. 1147 (1942) (classic
article).
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B. Industry Standards in Products Liability Law
These negligence law principles concerning evidence of custom
88 apply
to negligence claims in products liability litigation.89 That is, evidence that a
defendant failed to or did adopt a standard for a product's design, warning,
or manufacturing process customarily used by manufacturers of similar
products normally is relevant evidence that, if otherwise admissible," the
88. The terms "custom" and "state of the art" are sometimes interchanged and often
confused. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 11, § 2 cmt. c reporters' note, at 81-
84; James Boyd & David E. Ingberman, Should "Relative Safety" Be a Test of Product
Liability?, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 433 (1997). "Custom" is customarily used to mean the prevailing
practices in an industry. See, e.g., Carter v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 716 F.2d 344, 347 (5th Cir.
1983) (explaining that custom means "the usual practice of the manufacturer, that is, what is
done"); Chown v. USM Corp., 297 N.W.2d 218, 221 (Iowa 1980) (explaining that custom
means "what was being done in the industry"). While "state of the art" may mean largely the
same thing as custom to business managers and engineers, the latter phrase, although variously
defined, has evolved into a term of art in products liability law that essentially means the best
science or technology reasonably available at the time of manufacture, in contrast to the
customary, prevailing use of science or technology. See, e.g., Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool
Co., 694 A.2d 1319, 1347 (Conn. 1997) ("[S]tate of the art refers to what is technologically
feasible, rather than merely industry custom.").
Perhaps the best summary of the difference between the two concepts is from Lohrmann v.
Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 782 F.2d 1156, 1164 (4th Cir. 1986) (Md. law):
Industry standards are the practices common to a given industry. . . often
set forth in some type of code, such as a building code or electrical code, or
they may be adopted by the trade organization of a given industry. State of
the art is a higher standard because scientific knowledge expands much more
rapidly than industry can assimilate the knowledge and adopt it as a standard.
Id. See also Hollingsworth & Vose Co. v. Connor, 764 A.2d 318, 334-36 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
2000). On state of the art, see OWEN, supra note 1, § 10.4.
89. See Boyd & Ingberman, supra note 88, at 439-40; David A. Urban, Comment,
Custom's Proper Role in Strict Products Liability Actions Based on Design Defect, 38 UCLA L.
REv. 439 (1990); FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, § 13.04[5]; MADDEN & OWEN, supra
note 11, § 27:6; 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 28:43; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS, supra note 11, § 2, cmt. d. On the very similar rules applied in most jurisdictions to strict
liability in tort, see OWEN, supra note 1, § 6.4.
90. To avoid the rule against hearsay and otherwise be admissible, Federal Rule of
Evidence 803(18) requires that published industry standards be reliable, meaning deemed
trustworthy by other professionals in the field, and be called to the attention of or relied upon by
an expert who can assist the fact finder by explaining the materials. See 2 McCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE § 321 (J. Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999) (citing FED. R. EVID. 803(18)). See generally
Brown v. Clark Equip. Co., 618 P.2d 267, 275-76 (Haw. 1980) (discussing hearsay problem);
Daniel E. Feld, Annotation, Admissibility in Evidence on Issue of Negligence of Codes or
Standards of Safety Issued or Sponsored by Governmental Body or by Voluntary Association, 58
A.L.R.3d 148, 153 (1974) (discussing admissibility of safety codes and standards); James L.
Routch, Comment, Admissibility of Safety Codes, Rules and Standards in Negligence Cases, 37
TENN. L. REv. 581, 582 (1970) (same). Additionally, evidence meeting these requirements may
still be excluded under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 if its probative value is outweighed by its
prejudicial impact or likelihood of confusing or misleading the jury. See FED. R. EVID. 403.
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defendant was or was not negligent in the manufacture and sale of its own
products. Either way, evidence of applicable customs may tend to show the
foreseeability of the risk as well as the cost, feasibility, utility, and
acceptability among consumers of the particular safety measures the
plaintiff asserts the defendant negligently failed to adopt. Thus, while a jury
may normally consider evidence of customary safety standards as bearing
on the standard of care and whether it was breached, such evidence is
usually only part of the package of evidence offered by the parties on the
particularities of the case. In addition to evidence of custom, a plaintiff
generally will want to introduce specific evidence as to the foreseeability
and magnitude of the risk, its hidden nature, and the feasibility, utility, and
cost-effectiveness of means to avoid it. A manufacturer, on the other hand,
will seek to show the opposite: that the risk was remote, open and obvious,
and impracticable and costly to remove. Evidence of custom, then, usually
will supplement these more basic types of proof as to particularly how and
why the defendant was or was not negligent in terms of the individual
elements of the calculus of risk.91
Industry customs are often developed over time and informally as a
matter of trial and error by engineers working in the field.92 Many formal
product safety standards are promulgated by standard-setting organizations,
such as the American National Standards Institute ("ANSI"),93 the American
Standards Association ("ASA"),94 the National Safety Council ("NSC"),95
Underwriters' Laboratories ("UL"),96 the Society of Automotive Engineers
("SAE"),97 the National Fire Protection Association,98 and other specialized
91. "[S]tanding alone [proof of compliance with custom] does not justify a directed verdict
on behalf of the actor." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 11, § 13 cmt. b reporters'
note.
92. See, e.g., Tri-Pak Mach., Inc. v. Hartshorn, 644 So. 2d 118, 120 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1994) (by implication). 0
93. See, e.g., DiCarlo v. Keller Ladders, Inc., 211 F.3d 465, 468 (8th Cir. 2000)
(stepladder standards); Clarke v. LR Sys., 219 F. Supp. 2d 323, 334 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (guarding
standard for grinders); Potter v. Chi. Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319, 1326 (Conn. 1997)
(vibration limits for tools).
94. See, e.g., Poches v. J.J. Newberry Co., 549 F.2d 1166, 1167 (8th Cir. 1977) (discussing
specifications for speed and angle of power mower blade).
95. See, e.g., Hutchison v. Urschel Labs., Inc., 157 F.3d 613, 615 (8th Cir. 1998) (guarding
standards for chicken dicer); Brown v. Clark Equip. Co., 618 P.2d 267, 275-76 (Haw. 1980)
(involving standards for operation of front end loaders).
96. See, e.g., McKinnon v. Skil Corp., 638 F.2d 270, 276-77 (1st Cir. 1981) (involving
lower-blade guard standards for power saw).
97. See, e.g., Alfred v. Caterpillar, Inc., 262 F.3d 1083, 1087-88 (10th Cir. 2001)
(discussing the design of asphalt paver speed control as lever rather than as counterintuitive
rotary dial).
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organizations, such as the National Spa and Pool Institute,99 the Scaffolding
and Shoring Institute,"' the Industrial Stapling and Nailing Technical
Association,1"' the American Conference of Governmental and Industrial
Hygienists,1 12 and many others." 3 Such organizations typically work closely
with industry to assure that the safety standards they establish, safety
"codes," are practicable as well as useful. Although some of these
organizations are more independent than others,1" safety standards
contained in the codes of organizations generally represent the industry's
consensus on the most appropriate balance of safety and practicality.
0 5
Because the organizations that issue such standards and codes may be
heavily influenced (if not controlled) by industry, courts generally treat the
admissibility of such standards the same as any other industry standards.'
0 6
But the formal way in which such standards may be developed and
formulated into specific codes, and industry's commensurate reliance upon
them, suggest that they sometimes should be accorded greater weight.
17
98. See Soproni v. Polygon Apartment Partners, 971 P.2d 500, 505-06 (Wash. 1999)
(window standards).
99. See Ryan v. KDI Sylvan Pools, Inc., 579 A.2d 1241, 1243-44 (N.J. 1990) (pool depth
standards).
100. See McNeal v. Hi-Lo Powered Scaffolding, Inc., 836 F.2d 637, 642 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(standards for scaffolding clips).
101. See Baier v. Bostitch, 611 N.E.2d 1103, 1106 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (contact trip on
nailer should prevent tool from discharging under its own weight).
102. See Potter v. Chi. Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319, 1326 (Conn. 1997) (vibration
limits for tools). These and other standards-setting organizations are described in 7 FRUMER &
FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, § 91.15.
103. See 6 FRUMER & FREDMAN, supra note 11, § 76.03.
104. See, e.g., Fayerweather v. Menard, Inc., No. 01-2414, 2003 WL 328788, at *2 (Wis.
Ct. App. Feb. 11, 2003) (discussing composition of ANSI's ladder committee membership as
one-third from industry, one-third from users, and one-third chosen from CPSC, OSHA, labor
organizations, and "outside specialists").
105. See Hansen v. Abrasive Eng'g & Mfg. Inc., 856 P.2d 625, 628 (Or. 1993) (ANSI
standards are helpful in determining whether defendant was negligent because they may
represent consensus on what reasonable person in industry would do).
106. However, because some standards-setting groups are comprised of members outside
the industry, and because their standards are voluntary guidelines of minimum safety, they are
not to be equated with "industry custom," as such. See Fayerweather, 2003 WL 328788, at *3
(stating that because one-third of ANSI ladder standards committee members came from outside
industry, "the standards are not evidence of 'custom and usage' within an industry as
contemplated" by standard jury instruction, so that court's failure to give it was not error).
107. See Vermett v. Fred Christen & Sons, 741 N.E.2d 954, 971 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000)
("compliance with ANSI is a compelling factor"); see also Tri-Pak Mach., Inc. v. Hartshorn,
644 So. 2d 118, 120 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (stating that trial court did not err in failing to
instruct on the effect of violating "engineering industry and organizational standards" which
plaintiff's expert only generally described and which had not been reduced to "any formal
industry standard or any published regulation").
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As proof of the negligence of a manufacturer's product design, courts
have admitted evidence of a defendant's failure to abide by industry
standards governing the design of such products as a toy action figure,10 8 a
tire,10 9 a meat grinder,' a front-end loader,' a cigarette lighter,'' 2 and
machinery and equipment that is unguarded" 3 or not equipped with an
emergency stop device." 4 So, too, have courts admitted, as proof of due
care, a manufacturer's compliance with design standards for a grinder,"5 a
tractor, 116 a press, 1 7 and a car."'
In negligence claims that a manufacturer has failed to provide adequate
warnings or instructions, courts have allowed plaintiffs to introduce
evidence that the defendant failed to conform to industry practices
governing appropriate warnings or instructions with respect to the assembly
of a floor lamp' 19 and the location of warnings on containers holding
explosive materials. 20 Similarly, as evidence of due care, courts have
allowed defendants to show their compliance with the customary types of
108. See Lugo ex rel. Lopez v. LJN Toys, Ltd., 552 N.E.2d 162, 162-63 (N.Y. 1990)
(involving injury to plaintiffs eye when an 8-pointed detachable star from Voltron-Defender of
the Universe was thrown just as on TV; expert's testimony, based on customs and standards in
toy safety community, that detachable star rendered design defective because Voltron would
throw his star on TV was sufficient to create question for jury and withstand defendant's motion
for summary judgment).
109. See Morden v. Cont. AG, 611 N.W.2d 659, 675-76 (Wis. 2000).
110. See De Pree v. Nutone, Inc., 422 F.2d 534, 535-36 (6th Cir. 1970) (UL standards for
cutter plate).
111. See Brown v. Clark Equip. Co., 618 P.2d 267, 275-76 (Haw. 1980) (National Safety
Council standards).
112. See Glover v. BIC Corp., 987 F.2d 1410, 1417 (9th Cir. 1993) (ASTM standards for
extinguishment).
113. See, e.g., Cigna Ins. Co. v. Oy Saunatec, Ltd., 241 F.3d 1, 12-13 (1st Cir. 2001)
(applying Massachusetts law); Cacevic v. Simplimatic Eng'g Co., 645 N.W.2d 287, 291-92
(Mich. Ct. App. 2001) (ANSI standards for guarding palletizer); Wallner v. Kitchens of Sara
Lee, Inc., 419 F.2d 1028, 1032 (7th Cir. 1969) (American Safety Standards Institute standards
for guarding conveyor).
114. See Almazan v. CTB, Inc., No. CIV.A.SA-99-CA355PMA, 2000 WL 33348244, at
*10 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 27, 2000) (ASME standards).
115. See Clarke v. LR Sys., 219 F. Supp. 2d 323, 334 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (ANSI guarding
standard for grinders).
116. See Spieker v. Westgo, Inc., 479 N.W.2d 837, 843-44 (N.D. 1992) (power take-off
driveline).
117. See Vermett v. Fred Christen & Sons Co., 741 N.E.2d 954, 971 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000)
(ANSI safeguards for press).
118. See Hasson v. Ford Motor Co., 650 P.2d 1171, 1182-83 (Cal. 1982) (SAE standards
for automotive brakes).
119. See Creadore v. Shades of Light, No. 01-CIV-4110(GBD), 2003 WL 152003, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 2003) (UL guidelines).
120. See Beadling v. William Bowman Assocs., 809 A.2d 188, 191 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2002).
warnings or instructions used for a trampoline
12' and asbestos products. 22
While most of the cases involving evidence of industry safety standards
pertain to a product's design, and occasionally to a product's warnings or
instructions, as just discussed, such evidence may also involve a product's
defective manufacture.
123
Evidence of compliance or noncompliance with an industry standard of
care is almost always admissible evidence on whether the defendant
exercised due care, 24 assuming the standard is applicable to the dangerous
aspect of the product in question, 125 but it rarely is conclusive of a
defendant's negligence. 126 Nevertheless, some courts view certain industry
121. See Anderson v. Hedstrom Corp., 76 F. Supp. 2d 422, 450 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
122. See Home v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 4 F.3d 276, 281-82 (4th Cir. 1993)
(N.C. law).
123. See, e.g., Holder v. Keller Indus., No. 05-97-01168-CV, 2000 WL 141070, at *5 (Tex.
App. Feb. 9, 2000) (involving ladder that broke constructed of low-density wood in violation of
ANSI standards); Short v. Estwing Mfg. Corp., 634 N.E.2d 798, 802 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994)
(discussing whether hammer that broke met ANSI standards for hardness of steel); see also Doe
v. Am. Nat'l Red Cross, 848 F. Supp. 1228, 1233 (S.D.W. Va. 1994) (assessing whether Red
Cross met collection standards of blood-banking industry to protect against risk that donor might
have AIDS). One of the earliest cases concerning manufacturing defect claims was Grant v.
Graham Chero-Cola Bottling Co., 97 S.E. 27, 28-29 (N.C. 1918) (bottle of ginger ale exploded
because it was too highly charged or bottle was defective).
124. See, e.g., MICH. COMiP. LAWS § 600.2946(1) (2004) (evidence of compliance
admissible); WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72.050 (2004) (compliance or noncompliance); Fidalgo v.
Columbus McKinnon Corp., 775 N.E.2d 803, 809 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002) (dictum); Kent Vill.
Assocs. Joint Venture v. Smith, 657 A.2d 330, 337 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995) ("where relevant
to the case and upon a proper evidentiary foundation, safety standards promulgated by
organizations such as ANSI may be admitted to show an accepted standard of care, the violation
of which may be regarded as evidence of negligence"). See generally FRUMER & FRIEDMAN,
supra note 11, § 3.04[5] ("almost every jurisdiction").
125. See, e.g., Fidalgo, 775 N.E.2d at 809.
126. See, e.g., Gable v. Vill. of Gates Mills, 784 N.E.2d 739, 747-48 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003)
(compliance with federal standards admissible as guide in determining liability, but compliance
alone is not conclusive); Rufer v. Abbott Labs., No. 48909-7-I, 2003 WL 22430193, at *7
(Wash. Ct. App. Oct. 27, 2003) (holding that compliance with custom evidence is of due care,
but does not conclusively disprove negligence); Brooks v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 902 P.2d 54, 64
(N.M. 1995) (stating that industry standards, "while probative of what a reasonably prudent
manufacturer would do, should not be conclusive"); Hillrichs v. Avco Corp., 514 N.W.2d 94, 98
(Iowa 1994) (custom of compicker manufacturers not to equip them with $50 emergency stop
device no defense to claim of negligent design); Short v. Estwing Mfg. Corp., 634 N.E.2d 798,
802 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994); Meseck v. Gen. Elec. Co., 600 N.Y.S.2d 384, 386 (App. Div. 1993)
(noncompliance with industry standards is some evidence of negligence, sufficient to raise a
factual question and hence avoid summary judgment, but is not conclusive on defendant's
failure to exercise reasonable care); Hasson v. Ford Motor Co., 650 P.2d 1171, 1182-83 (Cal.
1982) (industry standards are "minimal," such that compliance with them does not establish due
care).
In Kentucky, compliance with customary industry standards results in a rebuttable
presumption that the product was not defectively designed or manufactured, applicable to any
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safety codes as particularly persuasive on whether a manufacturer was127 or
was not 12  negligent, and an argument may be made for holding
compliance 129 or noncompliance 3 ' with clear and important industry
standards to be dispositive of product defectiveness in unusual situations.
III. RES IPSA LoQuITuR
A. Nature of Doctrine
1. Purpose
To establish a defendant's negligence, a plaintiff usually must prove,
with specificity, the manner in which the defendant was negligent in making
or selling the product that injured the plaintiff. Proof merely that a product
malfunctioned and caused an accident normally will not suffice. 3 ' Stated
otherwise, a plaintiff typically cannot make out a prima facie case if he or
she fails to establish just how the defendant was negligent and how that
negligence caused his harm. The absence of direct evidence establishing
precisely how or why a product was defective may be due to circumstances
beyond the plaintiffs control, as where the product is destroyed in the
accident or because there simply is no way for the plaintiff to uncover what
went wrong on the assembly line long ago. Sometimes, as when the plaintiff
products liability action. See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.310(2) (Michie 2004). The opposite is
true in Nevada. See M & R Inv. Co. v. Anzalotti, 773 P.2d 729, 730 (Nev. 1989) (manufacturer
presumptively negligent if elevator violated ANSI standards).
127. See, e.g., Morden v. Cont'l AG, 611 N.W.2d 659, 675-76 (Wis. 2000).
128. See, e.g., Vermett v. Fred Christen & Sons, 741 N.E.2d 954, 971 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000)
("[C]ompliance with ANSI is a compelling factor"); McKee v. Cutter Labs., Inc., 866 F.2d 219,
224 (6th Cir. 1989).
129. See, e.g., Lamb v. Kysor Indus. Corp., 305 A.D.2d 1083, 1084 (N.Y. 2003) (evidence
that saw guard met industry standards at time of manufacture sufficient to establish product was
not defective as matter of law); Wilder v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A. Inc., 23 Fed. Appx. 155,
157 (4th Cir. 2001) ("While conformity with industry custom does not absolve a manufacturer
or seller of a product from liability, such compliance may be conclusive when there is no
evidence to show that the product was not reasonably safe.").
130. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Achieving Consensus on Defective
Product Design, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 867, 876 (1998) (arguing that defendant's violation of
clear industry standard should be conclusive proof of product's defectiveness).
131. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 11, § 39, at 242-57; DOBBS, supra note 11, § 154,
at 370-75.
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encounters a bug'3 2 or a mouse 1 33 in his Coke or a toe in his chewing
tobacco, 134 the circumstantial evidence surrounding the misadventure quite
strongly suggests that the product's defective condition resulted from some
negligent act or omission of the defendant manufacturer or other supplier.
135
In situations such as these, negligence law contains a device that allows a
plaintiff to establish a prima facie case without direct evidence of how
specifically the product failed or how the defendant may have been
negligent--"res ipsa loquitur."
Res ipsa loquitur ("res ipsa") is an established doctrine of circumstantial
evidence,'36 applied by name in nearly every state, 137 that may assist a
plaintiff in proving a negligence claim in a products liability case as in any
other type of case. 138 The doctrine originated from a casual remark by Chief
Baron Pollock during argument with counsel in Byrne v. Boadle,139 where a
pedestrian, hit on the head by a barrel of flour that rolled out of a second
story window over the defendant's shop beside the street where the plaintiff
132. See, e.g., Birmingham Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Sellers, 39 So. 2d 706, 707 (Ala. Ct.
App. 1949) ("a cockroach or bug of some kind"); Okla. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Newton, 237
P.2d 627, 628 (Okla. 1951) (fly).
133. See, e.g., Eisenbeiss v. Payne, 25 P.2d 162, 164 (Ariz. 1933); Moss v. Coca Cola
Bottling Co. 229 P.2d 802, 803 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1951); Harris v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,
183 N.E.2d 56, 58 (111. App. Ct. 1962); Trembley v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Chi., 138
N.Y.S.2d 332, 333 (App. Div. 1955). See generally R.D. Hursh, Annotation, Presumption or
Prima Facie Case of Negligence Based on Presence of Foreign Substance in Bottled or Canned
Beverage, 52 A.L.R.2d 117 (1957).
134. "We can imagine no reason why, with ordinary care, human toes could not be left out
of chewing tobacco, and if toes are found in chewing tobacco, it seems to us that somebody has
been very careless." Pillars v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 78 So. 365, 366 (Miss. 1918).
135. "Some circumstantial evidence is very strong, as when you find a trout in the milk."
Journal Entry of Henry David Thoreau (Nov. 11, 1850), in 2 THE JOURNAL OF HENRY DAVID
THOREAU 94 (Bradford Torry & Frances H. Allen eds., 1984).
136. DOBBS, supra note 11, §§ 155-161, at 373-89; HARPER, LAW OF TORTS, supra note 9,
§ 19.5-19.12; CAL. EVID. CODE § 646 (West 2004); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D,
at 156-57. See also MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 90, § 342; 9 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 2509 (3d ed. 1940).
137. South Carolina takes perverse pride in eschewing the doctrine by name while applying
largely similar principles of circumstantial evidence. Compare Legette v. Smith, 220 S.E.2d
429, 430 (S.C. 1975) (rejecting doctrine), with McQuillen v. Dobbs, 204 S.E.2d 732, 735 (S.C.
1974) (applying similar circumstantial evidence principles).
138. See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 11, § 15:01-15.3; FRUMER
& FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, § 10.04; MADDEN & OWEN, supra note 11, § 7:9; Jonathan M.
Hoffman, Res Ipsa Loquitur and Indeterminate Product Defects: If They Speak for Themselves,
What Are They Saying?, 36 S. TEX. L. REV. 353, 355 (1995). For a discussion of the
"malfunction doctrine" (or, informally, "defect ipsa loquitur"), a parallel theory of proof in strict
products liability, see OWEN, supra note 1, § 7.4.
139. 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (Ex. 1863). See also DOBBS, supra note 11, § 155, at 373-76;
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 11, § 39, at 242-57.
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was walking, sought recovery from the defendant without introducing
affirmative proof of why the barrel fell from the window.14 ° To the
defendant's argument that the plaintiff's case must be dismissed because he
failed to prove specifically how the defendant was negligent in allowing the
barrel to tumble from the window, Chief Baron Pollock remarked, "res ipsa
loquitur," the thing speaks for itself, and allowed the plaintiffs verdict."'
This remark promptly evolved into a full-blown doctrine'42 that a plaintiff
may establish a defendant's breach of duty indirectly, in situations where an
accident's specific cause is unknown but where the circumstances indicate
that some negligence by the defendant probably was its cause. This doctrine
has been warmly embraced by (and has introduced complication into)'43 the
Anglo-American law of negligence. 44
Especially prior to the development of strict liability theories of products
liability law in the 1960s, res ipsa served in certain cases as an important
mechanism for unburdening plaintiffs from having to establish specifically
how a manufacturer or other supplier had been negligent in the production
or sale of a defective product. Particularly in manufacturing defect cases,
where the product violently malfunctioned, res ipsa provided a bridge
between the difficulties of proving negligence by direct evidence and
modem products liability claims based on product defect that relieve a
plaintiff, at least in theory, from having to prove a manufacturer's fault at
all.
A prime example is Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.,145 a negligence
case against the bottler by a waitress injured when a bottle of Coke
exploded in her hand. Today, Escola is remembered for Justice Traynor's
140. Byrne, 159 Eng. Rep. at 299.
141. Id. at 299-300.
142. But see Jackson v. Millar, [1975] S.C.R. 225, 235-36 (Can. 1975); Ballard v. N.
British Ry. Co., 1923 S.L.T. 219, 226 (Scot. 1923) (Lord Shaw) ("If that phrase had not been in
Latin, nobody would have called it a principle.").
143. Res ipsa is "a thing of fearful and wonderful complexity and ramifications, and the
problems of its application and effect have filled the courts of all our states with a multitude of
decisions, baffling and perplexing alike to students, attorneys and judges." William L. Prosser,
Res Ipsa Loquitur in California, 37 CAL. L. REv. 183, 183 (1949).
144. Two years after Byrne v. Boadle, the res ipsa doctrine was described by Chief Justice
Erie:
[There must be] reasonable evidence of negligence; ... but where the thing is
shewn to be under the management of the defendant or his servants, and the
accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those
who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in
the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from
want of care.
Scott v. The London & St. Katherine Docks Co., 159 Eng. Rep. 665 (Ex. 1865).
145. 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
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celebrated concurring opinion in which he outlined the various reasons for
favoring a rule of "absolute liability" for manufacturers of defective
products, 4 6 reasons which provided the theoretical basis for his opinion for
the court in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,'147 nearly two decades
later.'48 Now largely forgotten is the fact that the Escola majority, on the
basis of res ipsa, upheld a judgment for the waitress despite her inability to
prove specifically how the defendant bottler may have been negligent.'49
With the advent of strict products liability in tort and warranty, and strict
liability's parallel "malfunction doctrine" in particular, res ipsa in most
jurisdictions has lost considerable importance. Yet, it remains a valid
doctrine that continues to be pled and on which plaintiffs continue to win
products liability claims.
2. Limitations
It may be helpful to note some attributes of the res ipsa doctrine that limit
its applicability. First, the doctrine applies only in situations where the
circumstances surrounding the accident are mysterious and unknown. That
is, there is neither need nor room for a doctrine of circumstantial evidence
that is designed to allow plausible guesses as to how an accident occurred
where direct evidence clearly identifies both the nature of the product's
defect and the defendant's conduct that allowed the defect to occur and
harm the plaintiff. So, while many courts allow a plaintiff to rely on res ipsa
even when the plaintiff pleads and offers specific evidence on negligence
and causation, on how and why a product accident occurred, 5' the doctrine
assuredly must vanish, like a bat in the proverbial light, once the plaintiffs
evidence fully and specifically explains how the product failed and the
reasonable steps the defendant could have taken to prevent the failure.15" '
Ordinarily, however, a plaintiff's proof of how an accident occurred will not
146. Id. at 440-44.
147. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
148. See OWEN, supra note 1, § 5.2.
149. See Escola, 150 P.2d at 440.
150. See, e.g., Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Thermogas Co., 620 N.W.2d 819, 831-32 (Iowa 2000);
see FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, § 10.04[4].
151. See, e.g., Stahlecker v. Ford Motor Co., 667 N.W.2d 244, 252 (Neb. 2003) ("[I]f
specific acts of negligence are alleged or there is direct evidence of the precise cause of the
accident, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is not applicable."); Dover Elevator Co. v. Swann, 638
A.2d 762, 774 (Md. 1994) (holding res ipsa inapplicable where plaintiffs expert fully explained
why elevator misleveled). See generally PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 11, at 260; DOBBS,
supra note 11, at 372, 387.
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be so specific and complete, in which case the plaintiff should be entitled to
rely upon res ipsa in addition to the more specific proof.152
Second, it should be stressed that res ipsa normally is little more than an
application of ordinary principles of circumstantial evidence to the accident
law context, albeit in crystalized form tailored to the law of negligence.'53
The principal benefit the res ipsa doctrine provides the plaintiff is to supply
an indirect means by which a jury may infer the defendant's breach of duty.
So, while causation frequently is also established by the res ipsa
inferences, 154 a plaintiff relying on res ipsa still has the burden of proving, in
almost all states, all the elements of a negligence case-the defendant's
duty, breach, cause in fact, proximate cause, and damage.'55 That is, the
procedural effect of res ipsa in most jurisdictions is merely to provide some
evidence of breach which a jury may accept or reject as it sees fit, such that
the plaintiff retains the burden of proof on this and the other elements of the
tort of negligence.
Third, one should also remember that res ipsa is a rule of negligence, not
strict products liability, such that the inferences or presumptions must point
to a probability that defendant was negligent in allowing a product to
become defective, not merely that the product was defective. Thus, the
doctrine establishes both defect and negligence, as where a product's
specific defect is unknown, and its failure destroys evidence of its cause-as
when a new car's engine compartment suddenly catches fire; or where the
presence of the defect is crystal clear, but its precise origin is a matter of
conjecture-as when a mouse shows up in a bottle of Coke. In either case,
what must be inferred is the defendant's negligence in allowing the defect
into the product and the product into the plaintiffs hands. And proof, no
matter how strong, of the product's defectiveness alone-whether direct or
circumstantial-simply will not suffice. For the latter, there is a closely
similar, newer doctrine of circumstantial evidence, the "malfunction
152. See, e.g., Weyerhaeuser, 620 N.W.2d at 831 (explaining that specific negligence and
res ipsa may be pled and submitted to jury in the alternative).
153. See, e.g., Waering v. BASF Corp., 146 F. Supp. 2d 675, 687 (M.D. Pa. 2001);
Weyerhaeuser, 620 N.W.2d at 831. See generally PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 11, § 39.
154. See, e.g., Knight v. Just Born, Inc., No. CV-99-606-ST, 2000 WL 924624, at *13-*14
(D. Or. Mar. 28, 2000) (allowing res ipsa for both negligence and causation); Dover Elevator,
638 A.2d at 765 ("Res ipsa loquitur is 'merely a short way of saying that the circumstances
attendant upon an accident are themselves of such a character as to justify a [court or] jury in
inferring negligence as the cause of that accident."' (citation omitted)). See generally PROSSER
& KEETON, supra note 11, § 39, at 247-48.
155. See, e.g., Dover Elevator, 638 A.2d at 765.
1028 [Ariz. St. L.J.
doctrine," specifically tailored to proof of defect for purposes of
establishing strict products liability.
156
B. Elements
Although res ipsa is properly not a cause of action but merely a method
of proof, it nevertheless has two or three definite elements. Most traditional
formulations of res ipsa in America derive from the first edition of Wigmore
on Evidence, which divided the doctrine into three elements:
(1) the event must be of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in
the absence of someone's negligence; (2) it must be caused by an
agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the
defendant; and (3) it must not have been due to any voluntary
action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff.
157
In order, these elements raise inferences (1) that someone was negligent, (2)
that the someone was the defendant, and (3) that the someone was not the
plaintiff. In combination, these elements provide that a plaintiff may rely on
res ipsa where the circumstances of an accident suggest that it probably
resulted from the defendant's negligence and not from the actions of the
plaintiff or another.
Recently, however, prompted by the widespread adoption of comparative
fault, many courts have eliminated the third element, an element which
seems to be based on the plaintiffs contributory fault. Thus, while many
courts continue to define the doctrine in terms of the traditional three
elements,'58 sounder formulations of res ipsa today limit the essential
elements to the first two, in which case the doctrine applies when (1) the
accident was of a type that ordinarily does not occur unless someone has
been negligent, and (2) the defendant had exclusive control over the
instrumentality at the relevant time.59 In terms of inferences, these elements
establish that the accident probably resulted from someone's negligence and
156. See OWEN, supra note 1, § 6.4; Owen, Manufacturing Defects, supra note 5, at 871-
84.
157. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 11, § 39, at 244 n.24 (citing 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 2509 (1st ed. 1905)). More currently, see 9 WIGMORE, supra note 136, § 2509, at 487-512; see
also 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 90, § 342, at 519.
158. See infra note 156.
159. See, e.g., McGuire v. Davidson Mfg. Corp., 258 F. Supp. 2d 945, 953 (N.D. Iowa
2003) (explaining that the Comparative Fault Act "abrogates the requirement that the plaintiff
show his actions did not contribute to the injury"); Barretta v. Otis Elevator Co., 698 A.2d 810,
812 (Conn. 1997); Turbines, Inc. v. Dardis, 1 S.W.3d 726, 741 (Tex. App. 1999); see also infra
note 157.
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that the negligent person was probably the defendant.1 60 Whether the
elements of res ipsa are established in any given case, and whether it
otherwise applies to the facts, are questions of law for the court.'61
It is sometimes said that res ipsa, which provides an incentive for a
defendant to come forward with evidence of how an accident occurred,
cannot be applied unless the plaintiff shows that the evidence is more
accessible to the defendant than to the plaintiff. 62 It is true enough that
providing such an incentive to defendants is one secondary function of the
doctrine. 163 Yet few courts today explicitly convert this secondary purpose
into a formal requirement, for to do so would confusingly erect a "cardboard
defense" that does little more than parrot the second element's requirement
that the plaintiff show the defendant controlled the instrumentality that
caused the harm."6 It should be helpful to examine the individual elements
in more detail.
1. Accident of a Type that Normally Results Only from
Negligence
The purpose of the first res ipsa element, that the accident was of a type
that ordinarily does not occur without someone's negligence, is to determine
if the accident was probably caused by a negligent act or omission. For
example, it may be that the negligence of someone is the most likely cause
of a mouse or bug in a Coke, 165 a toe in chewing tobacco, 166 a trout in the
milk, 67 a candy that burned the plaintiffs mouth, so that it felt on fire, 168 a
160. See, e.g., Turbines, Inc., 1 S.W.3d at 741 ("The first factor is necessary to support the
inference of negligence and the second to support the inference that the defendant was the
negligent party."). See generally DOBBS, supra note 11, § 154, at 370-73.
161. See, e.g., Barretta, 698 A.2d at 811.
162. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 11, § 39, at 254; DOBBS, supra note 11, § 160, at
385-87.
163. See, e.g., Turbines, Inc., 1 S.W.3d at 740.
The purpose of res ipsa loquitur is to relieve the plaintiff of the burden of
proving a specific act of negligence by the defendant when it is impossible
for the plaintiff to determine the sequence of events, or when the defendant
has superior knowledge or means of information to determine the cause of
the accident.
Id.
164. Professor Dan Dobbs must be credited with this apt metaphor. See DOBBS, supra note
11, § 160, at 386.
165. See, e.g., Harris v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 183 N.E.2d 56, 58 (Ill. App. Ct. 1962)
(mouse); Okla. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Newton, 237 P.2d 627, 628 (Okla. 1951) (fly).
166. See Pillars v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 78 So. 365, 365 (Miss. 1918).
167. See THOREAU, supra note 135, at 94.
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new motor home that in fact catches on fire,169 a hand grenade with visible
defects that explodes too quickly,17 or the steering17' or brakes 72 of an
automobile that suddenly fail.
Looked at from the other direction, limiting the res ipsa doctrine's
operation to situations in which someone probably was negligent properly
excludes from coverage true accidents most likely caused by no one's fault.
While many product misadventures are attributable to someone's failure to
exercise reasonable care-the manufacturer, the user, or someone else-
many others are an inevitable result of imperfect humans using imperfect
machines in an uncertain world. Thus, it may be most likely that a product
accident is attributable to one's negligence when injury results from a new
motor home that catches fire,'73 a vehicle that suddenly loses its steering,'74
a blood transfusion that causes serum hepatitis, 75 an escalator that
malfunctions,176 an air bag that fails to deploy,'77 or an underground gas tank
that springs a leak and explodes.'78 In each such case, because the product
might well have failed for reasons other than someone's negligent act or
omission, res ipsa did not apply.
2. Defendant's Exclusive Control
a. In General
No matter how clearly the plaintiff establishes the first element, that
someone was negligent in making or handling the product, a res ipsa case
will fail unless the plaintiff further shows that the defendant is the particular
party who most probably was responsible for the negligence. Traditionally,
and quite roughly, this inference is established by showing that the
manufacturer or other defendant had exclusive control of the instrumentality
168. See Knight v. Just Born, Inc., No. CV-99-606-ST, 2000 WL 924624, at *2 (D. Or.
Mar. 28, 2000).
169. See Hinckley v. La Mesa R.V. Ctr., Inc., 205 Cal. Rptr. 22, 23 (Ct. App. 1984).
170. See McGonigal v. Gearhart Indus. Inc., 788 F.2d 321, 322-23 (5th Cir. 1986).
171. See Gen. Motors Corp. v. Dillon, 367 A.2d 1020, 1021 (Del. 1976).
172. See, e.g., Holman v. Ford Motor Co., 239 So. 2d 40, 41 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
173. See Rocky Mountain Fire & Cas. Co. v. Biddulph Oldsmobile, 640 P.2d 851, 853
(Ariz. 1982).
174. See, e.g., Beatty v. Ford Motor Co., 574 S.E.2d 803, 805-06 (W. Va. 2002); Brothers
v. Gen. Motors Corp., 658 P.2d 1108, 1109 (Mont. 1983).
175. See Schmaltz v. St. Luke's Hosp., 521 P.2d 787, 788-89 (Colo. Ct. App. 1974).
176. See, e.g., Ellis v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 388 S.E.2d 920, 920-22 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989).
177. See Batiste v. Gen. Motors Corp., 802 So. 2d 686, 687 (La. Ct. App. 2001).
178. See Mitchell v. Suburban Propane Gas Corp., 581 N.Y.S.2d 927, 934 (App. Div.
1992).
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that caused the accidental harm-the product in question-at the relevant
time. That is, the "exclusive control" requirement is simply another way of
assuring that the injury is traceable "to a specific instrumentality or cause
for which the defendant was responsible." '79
It is of utmost importance in products liability cases whether the relevant
time of exclusive control over the instrumentality is viewed as the time of
the accident that caused the plaintiffs injury or the time of the probable
negligence. 8 ° Basing res ipsa on the defendant's control at the time of the
accident makes good sense in conventional types of tort cases where res ipsa
has long been employed, such as a passenger's claim against the driver
where a car leaves the highway and goes into a ditch, a type of case where
common sense suggests that the operator of the vehicle at the time of the
accident was most likely responsible for the car's misadventure. But
ascertaining who had control of the instrumentality at the time of the
accident makes no sense in some contexts, including those involving
products liability claims. No matter how powerful the circumstantial
evidence that a defective or malfunctioning product resulted from some
negligence by the manufacturer, the manufacturer will have relinquished
control of the product to a retail dealer or someone else long before a
product accident occurs. Indeed, plaintiffs themselves often are in control of
products at the time they are injured. So, if a car-in-a-ditch case is brought
by the driver's estate against the manufacturer of the car, and the plaintiff
proves that the car was new, the weather was clear, the roadway was empty,
and the driver was awake and sober, the relevant time of control in such a
products liability case would seem to be the time when the product was
designed and manufactured, not the time of the accident. To take another
example, a person drinking a bottle of Coke who suddenly encounters a
mouse or a bug surely has control of the product at the time of the
misadventure. But the circumstantial evidence in such a case is very strong
that the relevant negligence was that of the bottler-who surely had control
of the product at the time of bottling, the time of the probable negligence,
and who just as surely had not a wit of control at the extraneous time of
consumption.
179. See Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Thermogas Co., 620 N.W.2d 819, 832 (Iowa 2000); PROSSER
& KEETON, supra note 11, § 39, at 248. "Exclusive control is merely one fact which establishes
the responsibility of the defendant; and if it can be established otherwise, exclusive control is
not essential to a res ipsa loquitur case." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D cmt. g, at
161.
180. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 11, § 39, at 250; DOBBS, supra note 11, § 157, at
378-81.
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Thus, if a court were to insist on applying the exclusive control element
in a products liability case mechanically to mean control-at-the-time-of-
injury, res ipsa almost never would be available in this type of litigation.''
For many years, however, a trend has been afoot to interpret the exclusive
control element more liberally in a way that promotes its purpose in
identifying the person most likely responsible for the negligence already
inferred by element number one.182 As early as Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling
Co.,'83 discussed above, courts were construing the control test in this more
logical manner. There, the court decisively held that exclusive control may
properly be determined at the time of the probable negligence, rather than at
the time of the accident.'84 For some time, many courts have similarly
interpreted the time of control in this commonsense fashion.'85
The probability that a defect is attributable to the manufacturer or other
supplier diminishes over time after a product is first manufactured and sold
as it suffers ordinary wear and tear, deterioration from the elements, abuse
by users and mechanics, repairs, accidents, and other misadventures.'86 By
the same token, as such incidents mount over the life of a product, the
likelihood increases that a defect causing a product malfunction is
attributable to such an event rather than to an original defect present at the
181. A few courts still do apply the exclusive control test narrowly in this manner. See, e.g.,
Harris v. Gen. Motors Corp., 34 Fed. Appx. 487, 490 (7th Cir. 2002) (concerning late
deployment of air bag on one-year-old car; res ipsa inapplicable because of absence of
defendant's exclusive control); McConchie v. Samsung Elecs. of Am., Inc., No. CIV. 99-40-JD,
2000 DNH 180, 2000 WL 1513777, at *4 (D. N.H. Aug. 11,2000) (finding res ipsa inapplicable
to six-month-old microwave that caught fire because it was installed in plaintiffs' kitchen and so
was not under defendant's exclusive control).
182. See, e.g., Pavon v. Rudin, 679 N.Y.S.2d 27, 30 (App. Div. 1998). See generally
FRUMER AND FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, § 10.04[3][a]; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 328D cmt. g at 161.
183. 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944).
184. See id. at 438.
Many authorities state that the happening of the accident does not speak
for itself where it took place some time after defendant had relinquished
control of the instrumentality causing the injury. Under the more logical
view, however, the doctrine may be applied upon the theory that defendant
had control at the time of the alleged negligent act, although not at the time of
the accident, provided plaintiff first proves that the condition of the
instrumentality had not been changed after it left the defendant's possession.
Id.
185. See, e.g., McGuire v. Davidson Mfg. Corp., 258 F. Supp. 2d 945, 953-55 (N.D. Iowa
2003); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Thermogas Co., 620 N.W.2d 819, 832 (Iowa 2000); see also
Turbines, Inc. v. Dardis, 1 S.W.3d 726, 741-42 (Tex. App. 1999) (dictum). See generally
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 11, § 39, at 250 ("[T]here is now quite general agreement" to
this effect.).
186. See OWEN, supra note 1, § 10.5.
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time of sale. Thus, the longer a product is out and about in the hurly-burly
world, the more likely it is that a product failure cannot be traced to the
doorstep of the original product suppliers. In such cases, once it becomes
more likely than not that causes other than the defendant's negligence were
responsible for a product's misbehavior, the exclusive control element
shields the defendant from the rigors of res ipsa. Hence, courts have refused
to apply res ipsa to a high mileage vehicle that malfunctioned,187 tires that
blew out, 8 8 an old ladder that buckled, 189 a car190 or tractor that caught
fire, 19' a folding chair that collapsed,'92 and to many other cases where
causes outside of the defendant's control best explain a product mishap.
b. Multiple Defendants
The exclusive control element is problematic for plaintiffs in cases with
multiple defendants.' 93 If more than one defendant handles a product in a
187. See, e.g., Mosesian v. Ford Motor Co., No. A096967, 2002 WL 31009208, at *4 (Cal.
Ct. App. Sept. 9, 2002).
No less than seven years elapsed between the time Ford relinquished
possession of the car and occurrence of the fire. During this time, the car
underwent a series of repairs, both major and minor, some of which involved
the electrical system. Three days before the fire, the car was in fact taken to a
repair shop for an apparent electrical malfunction. There was no evidence
linking the fire to the original condition of the car or rebutting the possibility
that the problem arose from a modification of the motor or electrical system
or from a faulty repair by a third party .... [T]he requirement of exclusive
control would be rendered meaningless if it could be applied to the present
case.
Id.; Beatty v. Ford Motor Co., 574 S.E.2d 803, 808 (W. Va. 2002) (discussing an alleged
steering failure on van driven 110,000 miles).
[O]ther responsible causes, including the conduct of the appellant and third
persons, [were] not sufficiently eliminated by the evidence. The record shows
it was not clear how the van had been operated or maintained over the many
miles that the van had accumulated, suggesting that the conduct of unknown
third persons could have caused the accident.
Id.
188. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Hughes Supply, Inc., 358 So. 2d 1339, 1342 (Fla.
1978).
189. See Crawford v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 295 F.3d 884, 885-86 (8th Cir. 2002)
(commenting that the ladder was twenty to twenty-eight years old).
190. See Parsons v. Ford Motor Co., 85 S.W.3d 323, 333 (Tex. App. 2002) (noting that the
ignition switch had been replaced before fire).
191. See U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. J.1. Case Co., 432 S.E.2d 654, 658 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993)
(explaining that the drivers used the tractor for 300 hours without reading instruction manual on
cooling engine down).
192. See Rivera-Emerling v. M. Fortunoff of Westbury Corp., 721 N.Y.S.2d 653, 654-55
(App. Div. 2001) (chair had been on sales floor to which innumerable shoppers had access).
193. See FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, § 10.04[3][c]; PROSSER & KEETON, supra
note 11, § 39, at 251-53.
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way that could cause the injury, no one defendant will have had exclusive
control over the product and a res ipsa case ordinarily should fail.
94 To
make out a res ipsa case against any one defendant in such a successive
control situation, a plaintiff usually will have to show that the probable
negligence was attributable to a particular defendant and not the others-by
evidence that implicates the particular defendant, exonerates the other
parties, or some combination of the two. 95 But a number of courts, in
varying situations, have allowed plaintiffs to rely on res ipsa against
multiple defendants who separately or jointly controlled the product before
it caused the injury. 96
3. Plaintiff s Noninvolvement
The third traditional res ipsa element is that the plaintiff did not
participate in causing the accident. Like the exclusive-control element, if
this element were applied literally, a plaintiff using a product at the time it
malfunctions could never recover under the res ipsa doctrine. Such a result
would sap res ipsa of much of its proper power. While some courts and
commentators have viewed the third element as a surrogate for contributory
negligence, albeit as part of the plaintiffs case in chief, the third
conventional element may more logically be viewed as a subset of and
194. See, e.g., Waering v. BASF Corp., 146 F. Supp. 2d 675, 687 (M.D. Pa. 2001).
The employment of res ipsa loquitur is problematic where, as here, there
are several defendants who had successive control over the harm-causing
instrumentality and there is no reason to believe that more than one defendant
is responsible for the harm. In such cases, the other defendants are 'other
responsible causes' that must be sufficiently eliminated in order for it to be
more likely than not that the remaining defendant is responsible for the harm.
Id.
195. See id at 688 (holding that evidence of prior negligent packaging by manufacturer of
hazardous chemicals, with no evidence of prior negligent shipping by distributors, sufficed to
implicate manufacturer and exonerate distributors).
196. See, e.g., Knight, Inc. v. Just Born, Inc., No. CV-99-606-ST, 2000 WL 924624, at *14
(D. Or. March 28, 2000) (defective candy manufacturer and seller); Ruiz v. Otis Elevator, 703
P.2d 1247, 1248-50 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985) (elevator that squashed plaintiff-owner and party
who manufactured, installed, and maintained it); Stalter v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Ark., 669
S.W.2d 460, 464 (Ark. 1984) (soft drink bottle that fell through bottom of carton bottler and
retailer, who shared control of display); Samansky v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Med. Ctr.,
567 N.E.2d 386, 393 (Ill. 1991) (catheter line that broke and remained in plaintiff's body during
bypass surgery-manufacturer, hospital, and doctors all had "consecutive" control); Nat'l Union
Fire Ins. Co. v. Harrington, 854 So. 2d 880, 891-92 (La. Ct. App. 2003) (res ipsa appropriate
against only possible tortfeasors, operator of vehicle and manufacturer, where former controlled
vehicle at time it caught fire in plaintiffs carport and latter controlled vehicle when it was
manufactured); Holliday v. Peden, 359 So. 2d 640, 642-43 (La. Ct. App. 1978) (surgical needle
that broke in plaintiff s throat during tonsillectomy-manufacturer, hospital, and surgeon).
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check on the second. That is, if the defendant at the relevant time had
exclusive control of the product, then the plaintiff must have had none-and
so could not have participated in causing the accident. 97 From either
perspective, the third element (as is true with the second) bears a distinctly
antiquarian appearance of a search for an accident's sole responsible
cause. 198 Yet modem principles of joint causation and comparative fault
have decisively discarded the notion that a plaintiff's case against a
negligent defendant is demolished if the plaintiff in some minor way
contributed to the accident's causation. 199
Today, while many courts continue to include the absence of voluntary
action by the plaintiff as part of the litany of the conventional three-element
res ipsa rule,2"0 many other courts have dropped the third Wigmorian
element and reduce res ipsa to its two principal elements: (1) the accident
being of a type that normally results only from negligence and (2) the
defendant's exclusive control of whatever caused the accident.20 ' Perhaps in
recognition that the plaintiff-noninvolvement element is logically subsumed
by the exclusive-control element, some courts rely upon the latter element in
197. See DOBBS, supra note 11, § 159, at 384-85.
198. See PROSSER& KEETON, supra note 11, § 39, at 254.
199. See, e.g., Montgomery Elevator Co. v. Gordon, 619 P.2d 66, 70 (Colo. 1980)
(remarking that the no-plaintiff-contribution element is "in direct contravention to the concept of
comparative negligence" because "[a] plaintiff.., who had to rely on res ipsa and who was only
slightly negligent would be barred from recovery since his contributory negligence would deny
him the application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine"). See generally DOBBS, supra note 11,
§ 159; OWEN, supra note 1, chs. 11, 12, and 13.
200. See, e.g., Mosesian v. Ford Motor Co., No. A096967, 2002 WL 31009208, at *3 (Cal.
Ct. App. Sept. 9, 2002); Williams v. Am. Med. Sys., 548 S.E.2d 371, 374 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001);
Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of La. v. Harrington, 854 So.2d 880, 891 (La. Ct. App. 2003); Darms
v. Bunce Rental, Inc., No. 24380-6-11, 2000 WL 1174548, at *6 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 18,
2000); see also Searle v. Suburban Propane Div. of Quantum Chem. Corp., 700 N.Y.S.2d 588,
592 (App. Div. 2000) (including a fourth element: "evidence as to the true explanation of the
event must be more readily accessible to the defendant than the plaintiff'); Beatty v. Ford Motor
Co., 574 S.E.2d 803, 808 (W. Va. 2002) (blending conduct of plaintiff or third persons into
single element and including duty as a separate element).
201. See, e.g., McGuire v. Davidson Mfg. Corp., 258 F. Supp. 2d 945, 951 (N.D. Iowa
2003) ("Two elements must be present for the doctrine to apply: '(1) the injury is caused by an
instrumentality under the exclusive control of the defendant, and (2) the occurrence is such as in
the ordinary course of things would not happen if reasonable care had been used."');
Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Thermogas Co., 620 N.W.2d 819, 831 (Iowa 2000); Parsons v. Ford Motor
Co., 85 S.W.3d 323, 332 (Tex. App. 2002) ("(1) the character of the injury is such that it would
not have occurred in the absence of negligence; and (2) the instrumentality which caused the
injury is shown to have been under the sole management and control of the defendant"). Some
courts add a duty element. See, e.g., Waering v. BASF Corp., 146 F. Supp. 2d 675, 686-87 (D.
Pa. 2001) (indicating that negligence in question must be within defendant's scope of duty to
plaintiff); Beatty, 574 S.E.2d at 808.
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The importance of res ipsa lies in its procedural effect. Like any other
type of circumstantial evidence, a large majority of courts hold that res ipsa
provides nothing more than an inference that the defendant was negligent,
an inference the jury is free to accept or reject.20 3 Yet an inference of this
type may be exceedingly important to a plaintiff deprived by circumstances
of direct proof of negligence and causation, saving him from summary
judgment or a directed verdict for the defendant.20 4 In these mere-inference
states, a defendant confronted with res ipsa may choose to introduce no
evidence at all, and simply argue that the plaintiffs circumstantial evidence
is insufficient to make a case. In a few states, however, res ipsa provides the
plaintiff with a "presumption" of negligence, or makes out a prima facie
case, that shifts the burden of going forward with the evidence (or the
"burden of proof") to the defendant who thereupon must produce some
evidence that it was not negligent or lose the case.2 5 Few terms are more
slippery than "presumption" and "burden of proof,"2 6 and a lawyer must
202. See, e.g., Darms v. Bunce Rental, Inc., No. 24380-6-II, 2000 WL 1174548, at *6
(Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 18, 2000). Cf Beatty, 574 S.E.2d at 808:
[T]here is a substantial possibility that the rain-soaked highway and/or the
appellant's carelessness in operating the van may have been, at the very least,
a contributing factor to the accident. Accordingly, the appellant has not
shown that the accident was of a kind that ordinarily would not have occurred
in the absence of the [defendant's] negligence.
Id.
203. See, e.g., Barretta v. Otis Elevator Co., 698 A.2d 810, 812 (Conn. 1997) ("The doctrine
permits, but does not compel, such an inference. The doctrine has no evidential force, does not
shift the burden of proof and does not give rise to a presumption. It is but a specific application
of the general principle that negligence can be proved by circumstantial evidence." (citations
omitted)).
204. See, e.g., Williams v. Emerson Elec. Co., 909 F. Supp. 395, 399 (M.D. La. 1995)
(denying summary judgment); Knight v. Just Born, Inc., No. CV-99-606-ST, 2000 WL 924624,
at * 11 (D. Or. Mar. 28, 2000) (same); Jurls v. Ford Motor Co., 752 So. 2d 260, 266 (La. Ct.
App. 2000) (reversing directed verdict).
205. See, e.g., Stalter v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Ark., 669 S.W.2d 460, 462 (Ark. 1984)
("[T]he burden shifts to the defendant to go forward with evidence to offset the inference of
negligence.").
206. When courts say that res ipsa shifts the "burden of proof," they usually mean only that
the doctrine shifts to the defendant the burden of producing evidence, not the ultimate burden of
persuasion. See MCCORMICK, supra note 90, § 342, at 433.
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look closely and skeptically at res ipsa opinions using those words to be
certain precisely what procedural effect the court has in mind.2 °7
IV. CONCLUSION
Negligence may not be the most glamorous products liability claim, but
it is regaining prominence as an essential, perhaps the primary, theory of
recovery for injuries resulting from product accidents. This article has
addressed three principal types of proof of negligence in modem products
liability litigation-violation of governmental safety statutes and regulations
(negligence per se), violation of industry codes and customs, and res ipsa. A
defendant's violation of a relevant safety standard set by a legislature or
governmental agency, or by the defendant's industry by custom or formal
code, ordinarily will go far in proving a plaintiffs negligence claim.
Similarly, a defendant's proof of compliance with such safety codes and
standards provides some (if less compelling) evidence that the defendant's
actions and omissions in making and selling the accident product were
consistent with all due care. In cases where a product is destroyed or the
plaintiff is otherwise unable to prove precisely why it failed and caused an
accident, the doctrine of res ipsa may be available to provide the plaintiff
with a method for establishing the defendant's negligence by circumstantial
evidence.2 8 All three types of proof-violation of government or industry
safety standards and product malfunctions that point to a defendant's
negligence-are powerful indicia that a manufacturer or other supplier of a
product involved in an accident may be subject to liability in negligence for
the resulting harm.
207. See, e.g., Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of La. v. Harrington, 854 So. 2d 880, 891-892 (La.
Ct. App. 2003) (describing res ipsa as allowing fact-finder to "infer negligence," as creating a"presumption of negligence," and as requiring defendant to "rebut an inference of negligence");
McGuire v. Davidson Mfg. Corp., 258 F. Supp. 2d 945, 952 (N.D. Iowa 2003) (stating res ipsa
doctrine permits "inference of negligence," yet defendant can present "rebutting evidence");
Opelika Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Johnson, 241 So. 2d 327, 328-29 (Ala. Civ. App. 1970)
(explaining how Alabama courts, in addressing the procedural effect of res ipsa, variously state
that the doctrine creates an inference of negligence; that it makes out a prima facie case of
negligence, shifting the burden of going forward to the defendant; and that it creates a
presumption of negligence). See 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 90, § 342, at 519.
208. A parallel principle of proof, often referred to as the "malfunction doctrine," applies in
most states to proof of defect in strict liability in tort. See OWEN, supra note 1, § 7.4; Owen,
Proof of Product Defect, supra note 4.
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